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FROM MORALITY TO EQUALITY: JUDICIAL REGULATION OF
BUSINESS ETHICS IN NEW YORK, 1920-1980
WILLIAM

E. NELSON*

Much legal doctrine in the early years of the twentieth century continued to reflect values of the preceding century. The law regulating the
conduct of businesspeople toward each other was no exception. Like so
much else in early twentieth-century law, the areas of fraud, privacy,
trespass, conversion, and interference with contractual relations-the
doctrines considered in this article-were fashioned to impede the
downward redistribution of wealth from individuals in higher-income
brackets to those in classes below them, who typically were immigrants
or children of immigrants.
By the end of the century, in contrast, different values had gained a
foothold. In particular, judges adopted a policy of circumscribing their
role in enforcing business ethics. By not enforcing doctrines that early in
the century had limited a sharp entrepreneur's ability to make money at
the expense of an established businessman, courts began, by the closing
decades of the century, to encourage entrepreneurial freedom, to facilitate upward social mobility, and thereby to make redistribution of wealth
easier. Judges did not similarly encourage those with established wealth
to take advantage of the poor, however, because they adopted new doctrines that protected those without knowledge, wealth, or power from
overreaching by those in an economically superior position. The result at
the end of the century was a legal order that promoted an equality of
sorts by tolerating redistribution from the "have's" to the "have not's"
while protecting the "have not's" from redistribution in favor of the
"have's."
This article examines these developments in the law of business con* Joel and Anne Ehrenkranz Professor of Law, New York University. A.B.,
Hamilton College, 1962; LL.B., New York University, 1965; Ph.D., Harvard University,
1971. The author is indebted to the members of the Legal History Colloquium at New
York Uni~rsity School of Law for their assistance and criticisms, and especially to William P. LaPiana. Research support was provided by the Filomen D'Agostino and Max E.
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duct, including the subjects of fraud, privacy, trespass, conversion, and
interference with contractual relations, by focusing on New York judicial
decisions between 1920 and 1980. I have chosen to focus on the law of a
single state because such a focus makes possible a distinct kind of study
in which one can examine not only leading cases known to all casebooks
but also the often highly revealing secondary opinions of the state's
highest court and the opinions of intermediate- and trial-court judges.
This focus also facilitates the placement of doctrinal change in a broader
pattern of political, intellectual, and cultural development. Hopefully, the
study of a single state will produce a deeper kind of knowledge than
would a rehash of the leading cases we already know.
New York provides the focus for this study because between 1920
and 1980 it was the most populous state as well as the cultural and economic leader of the nation. In its metropolitan center, in its upstate industrial cities, in its suburbs, and in its rural farmlands and environmentally
protected woodlands, it contained locales similar to those in all the rest
of the nation with the exception of the Deep South and the Pacific
Southwest. New York was more representative of the nation as a whole
than any other state, and hence the findings of this article should serve as
preliminary hypotheses about the development of American law in general in the twentieth century-until other scholars, through equally detailed studies of California, Texas, Georgia, and elsewhere, prove them
wrong.
In one important respect, however, New York was not typical.
Throughout the first half of the twentieth century, New York culture displayed, in exaggerated form, a cleavage that cut across American life
between a white, Anglo-Saxon, Protestant elite, on the one hand, and
Catholic and Jewish immigrants and their descendants seeking to improve their status, on the other. From the 1930s through the 1960s, New
Yorkers were also at the center of efforts to secure entry of Catholic and
Jewish ethnics into the American mainstream. A primary claim of this
article is that the doctrines of fraud, privacy, trespass, conversion, and
interference with contractual relations under examination herein had the
effect, and perhaps even the purpose, in the first half of the century of
keeping Catholic and Jewish immigrants and their descendants in the
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lower-income brackets. Legal doctrines on the same issues had the opposite effect in the second half of the century by facilitating the upward
economic climb of ethnics, which well may have been their purpose. Because this connection between social mobility and doctrinal transformation emerges more clearly in the context of New York than in other jurisdictions, New York merits intensive study.
Part I of this article will examine the law of fraud, privacy, trespass,
conversion, and interference with contractual relations as it existed during the decade of the 1920s and how it sometimes persisted for years
thereafter. Part II will then turn to an analysis of newer ethical norms and
other doctrinal developments that encouraged entrepreneurs to take advantage of business opportunity and thereby achieve upward economic
mobility. These new norms and developments, as we shall see, had their
origins at the end of the 1920s, but they did not come to full fruition until
the last quarter of the century.

I. ELITIST LAW DURING ThE 1920s
The early twentieth century, as one business historian has noted, was
a time not of equality but of "repression along class and ethnic lines."1
Only a "very few men in every hundred or thousand," it was said, had
sufficient "industry, brains and thrift" to get ahead. 2 Wage workers, according to the same writer, remained employees of others because they
had "not initiative enough to be employers themselves" 3; they remained
"poor" because of a "lack of brains, lack of wit to earn, thrift to save, and
knowledge to use [their] savings. ' 4 "No man who ha[d] endeavored to
carry out an enterprise," according to a turn-of-the-century sermon, could
avoid being "well-nigh appalled at times by the imbecility of the average

1. STEPHEN Fox, THE MIRROR MAKERS: A HISTORY OF AMERICAN ADVERTISING
AND ITS CREATORS 100 (1984).

2. CHARLF.S N. FAY, BusINEss IN POLmcS:
AmRIcAN BuSINESS 103 (1926) (emphasis in original).
3. Id. at 164.
4. Id. at 103.

SUGGESTIONS

FOR LEADERS

IN
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man-the inability or unwillingness to concentrate on a thing and do it."5
Indeed the "nature of man [was] so squarely built upon the doctrine of
the inferior many scarcely appear[ed]
the elite that the superior few and
6
to belong to the same species."
Ethnic prejudices often lay beneath the social inequality of the
1920s, which contrasted "a WASP vision of a tasteless, colorless, odorless, sweatless world" against a portrait of "[e]thnic minorities [who]
cooked with vivid spices--even garlic!-and might neglect ... deodorants, and regular bathing" and need to be shown "how to cleanse themselves.",7 There was virulent anti-Semitism, for example, on the part of
prominent people such as Henry James, who expressed shock at the "Hebrew conquest of New York" that was transforming the city into a "new
Jerusalem," and Henry Ford, who, during the 1920s, issued repeated
warnings against the "Jewish problem' 8 and who, in 1938, accepted the
Grand Cross of the German Eagle from the Nazi regime. 9 Ethnic prejudice also extended to other groups, especially the Irish and Italians, and
was acknowledged even by members of minorities themselves. Consider,
for example, What Makes Sammy Run?, a novel by Budd Schulberg
about "a Jewish boy from ...Manhattan's Lower East Side," who was
"no different from the little wops and micks who cursed and fought and
cheated." 10 Schulberg thought of his lead character as a boy "rocking in
his cradle of hate, malnutrition, prejudice, suspicions, amorality, the an-

5. PETER BArDA, POOR RicHARD's LEGACY: AMERICAN BUSINESS VALUES FROM
BENJAMIN FRANKLIN TO DONALD TRUMP 241 (1990) (quoting ELBERT HUBBARD, A
MESSAGE TO GARcIA AND THIRTEEN OTHER THINGS (1901)).

6. JAMES WARREN PROTHRO,
210 (1954).
7. Fox, supranote 1, at 101.
8.

THE DOLLAR DECADE: BUSINESS IDEAS IN THE 1920's

HOWARD M. SACHAR, THE COURSE OF MODERN JEwISH HISToRY 339, 341

(1958).
9. See BAIDA, supra note 5, at 203-06.
10. RiCHARD M. HUBER, THE AMEmCAN IDEA OF SUCCESS 410 (1971).
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11
archy of the poor.., a mangy little puppy in a dog-eat-dog world."
If white, Anglo-Saxon, Protestant business elites saw Catholic and
Jewish business competitors as lazy, hateful, suspicious, and amoral
cheats, their vision of themselves stood in marked contrast. For elites,
"dishonesty and sinful behavior of any sort was considered not only ignoble but also an impractical way to make money."12 WASPs understood
that they possessed "[c]haracter ...a stiffening of the vertebrae which
...cause[d] them to be loyal to a trust, to act promptly, concentrate their
energies, [and] do the thing."'13 They felt themselves bound by a
"PHILOSOPHY OF FAIR PLAY,' 14 which Julius H. Barnes, president
of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, explained as follows:

In America the various sports of our youth teach the principles of
team play and of fair play.... On every baseball diamond and
football field the qualities of fortitude and courage and fair play,
to club or town or college, are instilled in our
inspired by loyalty
5
young men.'
WASPs ran their lives and businesses, they believed, in 6accordance with
this creed of fortitude, hard work, loyalty, and fair play.1
The WASP elite that dominated the business and legal order of New
York at the outset of the 1920s had little doubt that the legal system

11.

Id. (quoting BUDD SCHULBERG, WHAT MAKES SAMMY RUN? (1941)). Of

course, immigrants and their descendants did not admit these accusations against them, as
is evidenced by Schulberg's statement that "Sammy was not a real Jew any more." Id.
12. HUBER, supranote 10, at 99.
13. See BAIDA, supra note 5, at 241 (quoting ELBERT HUBBARD, A MESSAGE TO
GARcIA AND THRTEEN OTHER THNGS (1901)).
14. JuLIus H. BARNES, THE GENIUs OF AMmRiCAN BusiNEss 6-7 (1924) (emphasis
in original).
15. Id. at 7.
16. See generallyPROTHRO, supra note 6, at 79-107.
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should abide by "the principles of right and justice and honesty"' 7-- that
is, that the law should impede any redistribution of wealth. As we next
examine the law of trespass, conversion, interference with contract
rights, fraud, and privacy, adherence to the policy of protecting the existing distribution of wealth will be apparent. Indeed, the early raison
d'etre of these five areas of tort law was the protection of property and
other established commercial rights.
A. Trespass
Common law trespass was designed explicitly to prevent redistribution of wealth, and New York at the outset of the 1920s adhered to traditional common law rules. In trespass, defendants were strictly liable, and
the ordinary "rule of action in the world at large"-that "a man ...
should not be held for consequences which a reasonably attentive and
careful man would not foresee"-did not apply.18 In trespass, property
rights trumped even the moral precept that a person not injure others in
the pursuit of self-interest. In trespass, "the owner [was] supreme[,] [h]is
house [was] his castle, and his estate his exclusive domain..... "No intrusion [was] so trifling as to be overlooked," or go "without remedy because it was unusual or unexpected." 20 Any "intrusion [was] at the peril
of the intruder." 21 Thus, a public utility that dropped small quantities of
lead onto a plaintiff's land was liable for the deaths of the plaintiff's dogs
resulting from their ingestion of the lead, not on a theory of negligence,
since the defendant could not reasonably foresee harm to the dogs, but on
a theory of trespass to land. 2
17. JOHN E. EDGERTON, Annual Address ofJohn E. Edgerton,Presidentof the NationalAssociation ofManufacturers;in 1930 PRoc. NAT'L Assoc. MANUFACrURERS U.S.
15.
18. Van Alstyne v. Rochester Tel. Corp., 296 N.Y.S. 726, 731 (Rochester City Ct.

1937).
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. See id.
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Protection of landed wealth was of such great moment that "[w]hen
one citizen trespasse[d] upon the real property of another," the trespasser
was required to "answer in damages for the injury committed," even
when the trespasser was the state.23 The "maxim 'de minimis non curat
lex' [was] never applied to the positive and wrongful invasion of another's [real] property," 24 and even an invasion of one-eighth of an inch
would be remedied. Where a trespass was "willful and unlawful," a
plaintiff might even be entitled to treble damages, 2 6 especially if the trespass had amounted to a crime.2 7

23. American Woolen Co. v. State, 180 N.Y.S. 759, 765 (Ct. Cl. 1920). As a general rule, damages were "measured by the annual income of the land during the time possession [was] withheld," Dime Say. Bank v. Altman, 9 N.E.2d 778, 780 (N.Y. 1937),
together with "other items of expense naturally flowing from ...[the] trespass." Zenith
Bathing Pavilion, Inc. v. Fair Oaks S.S. Corp., 207 N.Y.S. 306, 309 (Ist Dep't 1925).
Annual income could be calculated on the basis of "gross receipts, less expenses," Dime
Say. Bank, 9 N.E.2d at 781 (quoting SEDGWICK ON DAMAGES § 909), or as a fixed annual
percentage of the market value of the land, see Summerville Fruit Farms, Inc. v. John
Petrossi Co., 209 N.Y.S. 367, 368 (Sup. Ct. Monroe County 1925). If the property that
had been taken had been sold, a plaintiff could alternatively recover the sale price. See
Lamport Mfg. Supply Co. v. Reiss, 257 N.Y.S. 449, 451 (Sup. Ct. 1st Dep't 1932). A
plaintiff in an appropriate case could also obtain injunctive relief. See Borland v. Curto,
201 N.Y.S. 236, 238 (Sup. Ct. Rensselaer County 1923).
24. Novi v. Del Prete, 202 N.Y.S. 86, 87 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1923).
25. See id. at 86.
26. Marconi Realty Corp. v. Goldstein, 13 N.Y.S.2d 547, 547 (Sup. Ct. 1st Dep't
1939). Treble damages were unavailable, however, if the defendant had acted under a
claim of right, see Roxbury Light & Power Co. v. Dimmick, 196 N.Y.S. 320, 322 (Delaware County Ct. 1922), or with the landowner's apparent consent, see Rock v. Belmar
Contracting Co., 252 N.Y.S. 463, 468 (Sup. Ct. Washington County 1930).
27. See Schneider v. 44-84 Realty Corp., 7 N.Y.S.2d 305, 311 (Sup. Ct. Bronx
County 1938). "The gist of a trespass, whether it be to realty or to personalty, [was] injury to possession." Oatka Cemetery Ass'n v. Cazeau, 275 N.Y.S. 355, 359 (1st Dep't
1934); accord Stark v. Howe Sound Co., 266 N.Y.S. 368, 373 (Sup. Ct. Chemung
County 1933). Trespass could lie even in the absence of physical entry, as when an airplane flew over land, see Cory v. Physical Culture Hotel, Inc., 14 F. Supp. 977, 981-83
(W.D.N.Y. 1936), aff'd, 88 F.2d 411 (2d Cir. 1937); United States v. One Pitcaim BiPlane, I1 F. Supp. 24,25-26 (W.D.N.Y. 1935), or rocks were thrown upon land as a consequence of blasting, see Meuser v. Louis Petrossi & Sons, Inc., 5 N.Y.S.2d 950, 951 (3d
Dep't 1938), and even on behalf of a property owners' association seeking to enjoin
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Trespass continued to be used throughout the century to protect
rights of property owners and to resolve disputes between them.28 Its use
was also expanded to protect the property rights of employers whose
land was invaded during the course of labor picketing; 5 to protect a

homeowner against a utility company that forcibly entered a residence to
disconnect gas and electric lines and remove meters; 30 and to protect the
rights of public entities whose buildings were invaded by protesters.3 '

picketing on the streets of a private community, see Sea Gate Ass'n v. Sea Gate Tenants
Ass'n, 6 N.Y.S.2d 387, 389 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1938). However, a person in possession as a mere licensee, see People ex rel. Wenck v. Fury, 219 N.Y.S. 893, 893 (2d Dep't
1927), or only in occasional possession under a deed from a person who was not the
owner could not maintain trespass, see Adams v. Warner, 204 N.Y.S. 613, 614-15 (3d
Dep't 1924).
28. Cases held, for example, that trespass could be maintained for a television
camera crew's unannounced entry into a restaurant cited for health code violations, see
LeMistral, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., 402 N.Y.S.2d 815, 816 (1st Dep't 1978), but not
for underground oil pollution absent proof that the polluter acted intentionally, see Phillips v. Sun Oil Co., 121 N.E.2d 249, 251 (N.Y. 1954); that treble damages could not be
obtained against a construction firm that intentionally excavated land adjacent to its
building site, see Hazak, Inc. v. Robertson Goetz Bldg. Co., 46 N.E.2d 893, 894 (N.Y.
1943); that a landowner could not sue a neighbor on account of overhanging branches
and trees but could cut them down, see Turner v. Coppola, 424 N.Y.S.2d 864, 866 (Sup.
Ct. Nassau County 1980); and that the owner of a private shopping center parking lot
could tow away trespassing automobiles that were parked overnight illegally, even in the
midst of a blizzard, see Rossi v. Ventresca Bros. Constr. Co., 405 N.Y.S.2d 375, 377
(White Plains City Ct. 1978), but could not cover the windows of cars with foot-square
stickers intentionally made difficult to remove, see Reed v. Esplanade Gardens, Inc., 403
N.Y.S.2d 416,416 (Sup. Ct. 1st Dep't 1978).
29. See Marriott In-Flite Servs. v. Rosado, 333 N.Y.S.2d 114, 115 (Sup. Ct. N.Y.
County 1972).
30. See Velardi v. Consolidated Edison Co., 313 N.Y.S.2d 194, 197 (Sup. Ct. N.Y.
County 1970).
31. See, e.g., Board of Higher Educ. v. Students for a Democratic Soc'y, 300
N.Y.S.2d 983, 989 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1969) (protesting war); People v. Martinez,
250 N.Y.S.2d 28, 31 (Crim. Ct. N.Y. County 1964) (protesting against police violence).
For other cases involving use of trespass, see generally People v. Munafo, 406 N.E.2d
780, 782 (N.Y. 1980) (whether owner of an underlying fee simple committed a trespass
by standing in front of a backhoe being used by the State Power Authority to put up a
transmission line along an easement across his farm), and State v. Bishop, 348 N.Y.S.2d
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B. Conversion
Somewhat analogous to trespass was the tort of conversion, which
dealt primarily with personal property, instead of real estate. "Conversion [was] any distinct act of dominion wrongfully exerted over another's personal property in denial of or inconsistent with his rights
therein, 3 2 even if the "interference" was only "very slight" 33 and did not

involve a taking of "physical possession.

34

To recover in an action for

990, 998 (Sup. Ct. Suffolk County 1973) (whether owner of shoreline property committed trespass by filling a salt marsh). A final case ruled that an owner of real property on
which the Thruway Authority discharged oil, sand and chemicals from a drain could not
bring a common law action for trespass in federal court, but had to seek relief in the State
Court of Claims. See Kohlasch v. New York State Thruway Auth., 460 F. Supp. 956, 959
(S.D.N.Y. 1978).
32. Meyer v. Price, 165 N.E. 814, 819 (N.Y. 1929); accordCasey v. Kastel, 142
N.E. 671, 673 (N.Y. 1924); Mendelson v. Boettger, 12 N.Y.S.2d 671, 673 (2d Dep't
1939); Gross v. Toder, 8 N.Y.S.2d 446, 446 (1st Dep't 1938); Melnick v. Kukla, 239
N.Y.S. 16, 18 (4th Dep't 1930); White v. Bronson, 197 N.Y.S. 583, 585 (lst Dep't 1922);
In re DiCrocco's Estate, 12 N.Y.S.2d 276, 278 (Sur. Ct. Richmond County 1939); Bloom
v. Wiener, 239 N.Y.S. 574, 577 (City Ct. Bronx County 1930).
33. Employers' Fire Ins. Co. v. Cotten, 156 N.E. 629, 630 (N.Y. 1927).
34. Suzuki v. Small, 212 N.Y.S. 589, 602 (1st Dep't 1925); accord Debobes v.
Butterly, 205 N.Y.S. 104, 107 (1st Dep't 1924); Stickles v. Bernier, 249 N.Y.S. 430, 435
(St. Lawrence County Ct. 1931). "In the usual ...action in conversion, there [was] a
willful wrong." Meisel Tire Co. v. Ralph, 1 N.Y.S.2d 143, 147 (Rochester City Ct. 1937).
Thus, conversion was held to have occurred when a bookmaker sold a Liberty bond on
behalf of a gambling customer whom he suspected had stolen it, see United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Leon, 300 N.Y.S. 331, 334 (N.Y. City Mun. Ct. 1937), when a bank
cashed a check containing a restrictive endorsement, see Soma v. Handrulis, 14 N.E.2d
46, 49 (N.Y. 1938). But see Woollard v. Shaffer Stores Co., 1 N.Y.S.2d 464, 465 (3d
Dep't 1938), when a seller took purchase money notes placed in escrow without complying with the escrow agreement, see Rollin v. Grand Store Fixture Co., 244 N.Y.S. 82, 8687 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1930); cf Hinkle Iron Co. v. Kohn, 128 N.E. 113, 114 (N.Y.
1920); Hirschberg v. Bertal Textile Co., 264 N.Y.S. 215, 218 (Ist Dep't 1933), when a
seller resold goods it was holding on the buyer's account, see D'Aprile v. Turner-Looker
Co., 204 N.Y.S. 566, 569 (4th Dep't 1924), rev'd on other grounds, 147 N.E. 15 (N.Y.
1925); cf George Haiss Mfg. Co. v. Becker, 189 N.Y.S. 791, 793 (3d Dep't 1921) (dealer
resold item held on manufacturer's account); In re Petrosemolo's Estate, 273 N.Y.S. 718,
721 (Sur. Ct. N.Y. County 1934) (dealer pledged as security for loan item held on shipper's account), when a creditor took merchandise and money from a debtor's store sev-

NEW YORK LAWSCHOOL LAWREVIEW

[Vol. 43

conversion, a plaintiff had to establish either possession or a right to immediate possession.35
As a general rule, not only the thief but also the "innocent holder...
of stolen property [was] liable for conversion." 36 "A wrongful intent

eral hours before the marshal arrived to levy execution, see Mateo v. Abad, 267 N.Y.S.
436, 438 (1st Dep't 1933), or when a creditor altered its security interests in property
without the approval of other interested parties. See Mendelson, 12 N.Y.S.2d at 673.
Those who converted stock certificates, as by refusing to return them to the true owner on
demand, see Pierpoint v. Hoyt, 182 N.E. 235, 236 (N.Y. 1932), or by procuring an issuance of new certificates in their own name, see United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v.
Newburger, 118 N.E. 141, 143 (N.Y. 1933), were deemed to have converted the stock
itself. See Bradley v. Roe, 13 N.Y.S.2d 693, 695 (2d Dep't 1939); Mailler v. United
States Pipe & Foundry Co., 282 N.Y.S. 591, 592 (2d Dep't 1935).
35. See British-American Tobacco Co. v. Federal Reserve Bank, 105 F.2d 935,
936 (2d Cir. 1939); Pierpoint v. Hoyt, 182 N.E. 235, 236 (N.Y. 1932); Geneva Prod.
Credit Ass'n v. C.S. Mead & Co., 290 N.Y.S. 445, 446 (4th Dep't 1936); Heinaman v.
George W. Haxton & Son, Inc., 272 N.Y.S. 598, 599 (4th Dep't 1934); Rosenberg v.
Lewis, 206 N.Y.S. 353, 354 (1st Dep't 1924); Vangellow v. East Side Say. Bank, 11
N.Y.S.2d 982, 984 (Rochester City Ct. 1939); Silk v. Silk, 295 N.Y.S. 517, 519 (Sup. Ct.
Kings County 1937); Mitchell v. Vande, 289 N.Y.S. 1033, 1034 (Wayne County Ct.
1936); Moskowitz v. Cohen, 286 N.Y.S. 152, 155 (N.Y. City Mun. Ct. 1936);
McGreevey v. New York Cent. R.R. Co., 256 N.Y.S. 211, 213 (Sup. Ct. Onondaga
County 1932); Yokoyama v. San Carlos Operating Co., 259 N.Y.S. 471,473 (N.Y. City
Mun. Ct. 1932); Rogers v. Landers, 218 N.Y.S. 98, 101 (Sup. Ct. Cayuga County 1926).
Proof of a title which conferred a right to immediate possession would suffice, see Kaufman v. Simons Motor Sales Co., 184 N.E. 739, 740 (N.Y. 1933); Cleminshaw v. Meehan,
258 N.Y.S. 225, 228 (3d Dep't 1932); Ward v. Powers, 204 N.Y.S. 79, 80 (1st Dep't
1924), but proof of a title that did not confer a right to possession without a court judgment was not sufficient, see McCoy v. American Express Co., 171 N.E. 749, 750 (N.Y.
1930); Kidder v. Hesselman, 196 N.Y.S. 837, 838 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1922); cf.
Saraga v. Strauss, 203 N.Y.S. 27, 28 (1st Dep't 1924) (buyer may not sue for conversion
of deposit when seller simply fails to make timely delivery of goods under contract).
Thus, it was a defense to an action for conversion that a plaintiff was wrongfully in possession, see Hof v. Mager, 203 N.Y.S. 161, 163 (1st Dep't 1924), that a stranger other
than plaintiff had a right to possession, see Chasnov v. Marlane Holding Co., 244 N.Y.S.
455, 461 (N.Y. City Mun. Ct. 1930), or that the plaintiff had agreed to let the chattel's
owner enjoy possession, see Shyne v. L.R. Mack, Inc., 193 N.Y.S. 70, 71 (3d Dep't
1922); cf Armstrong Rubber Co. v. Griffith, 43 F.2d 689, 692 (2d Cir. 1930) (parties
negotiating over right to possession when alleged conversion occurred).
36. Gruntal v. National Sur. Co., 173 N.E. 682, 684 (N.Y. 1930).
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[was] not an essential element of ... conversion. 37 Conversion, like
trespass, thus had real bite as a strict liability tort designed to prevent
redistribution of wealth.38 Conversion, also like trespass, continued to be

37. Meisel Tire Co., 1 N.Y.S.2d at 147 (quoting Boyce v. Brockway, 31 N.Y. 490,
493 (1865)). When a defendant was in lawful possession of chattels and had no knowledge that it was exercising dominion over them inconsistent with the true owner's rights,
conversion would occur only when the true owner made a demand for their return. See
Banque de France v. Equitable Trust Co., 33 F.2d 202, 208 (S.D.N.Y. 1929). The demand, in effect, provided notice of superior rights, and the refusal to accede to it constituted an exercise of dominion in violation of those rights. See Employers'FireIns. Co.,
156 N.E. at 630. In the absence of a demand, the tort of conversion would not exist, see
Demarco v. Pickett Motor Sales, Inc., 251 N.Y.S. 294, 295 (4th Dep't 1931); Shea v.
Chinn, 229 N.Y.S. 24, 25 (3d Dep't 1928); Decalcomanie Transfer Ornaments Co. v.
Hajim, 227 N.Y.S. 647, 648 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1928), unless the defendant had in
some other way exercised an act of ownership inconsistent with the ownership and dominion of the true owner, see DelPiccolo v. Newburger, 9 N.Y.S.2d 512, 513 (1st Dep't
1939); accord Goebel v. Clark, 275 N.Y.S. 43, 46-47 (4th Dep't 1934); Atlas v. Moritz,
216 N.Y.S. 490, 494 (4th Dep't 1926); Chandler v. P.W. Chapman & Co., 218 N.Y.S.
604, 604 (2d Dep't 1926); Price v. Evans, 275 N.Y.S. 558, 560 (County Ct. Oneida
County 1934).
38. Many of the ordinary rules of tort were applied in conversion actions, however. Custom, for example, was admissible to prove the scope of a party's power to pass
title to property, see Green v. Wachs, 241 N.Y.S. 341, 342-43 (Ist Dep't 1930), and foreign law was dispositive of the parties' rights if the conversion had occurred on foreign
soil, see Banque de France v. Equitable Trust Co., 33 F.2d 202, 206 (S.D.N.Y. 1929); M.
Salimoff & Co. v. Standard Oil Co., 186 N.E. 679, 682 (N.Y. 1933). Of course, suits
brought in New York for torts that had occurred within the state were governed by New
York law, unless federal legislation had preempted the field. However, if a tort had taken
place outside the state, New York courts applied the substantive law of the place where
the tort had occurred. See Curtiss v. New York Cent. R.R., 79 F.2d 91, 93 (2d Cir. 1935);
Jerrell v. New York Cent. R.R., 68 F.2d 856, 857 (2d Cir. 1934); Jarrett v. Wabash Ry.
Co., 57 F.2d 669, 671 (2d Cir. 1932); The Mandu, 15 F. Supp. 627, 629 (E.D.N.Y. 1936);
Dougherty v. Gutenstein, 10 F. Supp. 782, 784 (S.D.N.Y. 1935); The Vestris, 53 F.2d
847, 855-56 (S.D.N.Y. 1931); Benton v. Safe Deposit Bank of Pottsville, Pa., 174 N.E.
648, 649 (N.Y. 1931); Fitzpatrick v. International Ry. Co., 169 N.E 112, 114-15 (N.Y.
1929); Travelers' Ins. Co. v. Central R.R. of N.J., 258 N.Y.S. 35, 37 (Sup. Ct. N.Y.
County 1932); LaForce v. Cataract Storage Co., 295 N.Y.S. 145, 147 (Monroe County
Ct. 1937). The law of the place of injury would not govern, however, if the parties had
provided otherwise by contract. See Conklin v. Canadian-Colonial Airways, Inc., 194
N.E. 692, 693 (N.Y. 1935). The main exception to the application of foreign substantive
law occurred when that law was strongly contrary to the public policy of New York, as
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was the case of a Connecticut rule permitting spouses to sue each other for torts. Thus,
the Connecticut rule was not applied in New York. See Mertz v. Mertz, 284 N.Y.S. 83,
86 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1935). However, foreign law that was merely different from the
law of New York, such as the Pennsylvania rule permitting recovery against the estate of
a tortfeasor, would be recognized by New York. See Domres v. Storms, 260 N.Y.S. 335,
336 (4th Dep't 1932); accord The Mandu, 15 F. Supp. at 629-30. There was, as one court
observed, "a growing conviction that only exceptional circumstances should lead one of
the states to refuse to enforce a right acquired in another." Domres, 260 N.Y.S. at 338
(quoting Loucks v. Standard Oil Co. of N.Y., 120 N.E. 198,201 (N.Y. 1918)).
While New York courts generally followed the substantive law of the jurisdiction in
which a tort had occurred, they remained committed to following their own rules of procedure. See Fitzpatrick, 169 N.E. at 114-15. As a result of this dichotomy between substance and procedure, it was often necessary to determine whether a particular rule was
substantive or procedural. A leading case held that the rules allocating burden of proof of
contributory negligence were a matter of substance rather than procedure, and it accordingly applied foreign law. See id. at 115. Another case dealing with a wrongful death held
that the proper plaintiff to bring the suit should likewise be determined by foreign substantive law, and thus it dismissed a suit brought by an administrator, as was required
under New York law, when foreign law gave the right to sue to the surviving spouse or
heir. See Sapone v. New York Cent. & Hudson River R.R. Co., 225 N.Y.S. 211, 216 (Sup
Ct. Monroe County 1927). When the law of another state was at issue, the party relying
on it had to plead and prove it; New York courts could not take judicial notice thereof.
See Ferguson v. Harder, 252 N.Y.S. 783, 787 (Sup. Ct. Columbia County 1931); Shaw v.
Blainey, 277 N.Y.S. 466, 467 (N.Y. City Mun. Ct. 1935). However, New York courts
would presume that the common law of a sister state was the same as the common law of
New York, see Shaw, 227 N.Y.S. at 468, and accordingly a party relying on the law of
another state had no need to prove it unless that law was statutory, see Lujan v. Lamport
& Holt Line, Ltd., 208 N.Y.S. 251, 253 (N.Y. City Mun. Ct. 1924), or was different from
that of New York.
When a tort occurred outside the state and all parties thereto were nonresidents of
New York, New York courts were "loath to take jurisdiction." Banco de la Lacuna v.
Escobar, 237 N.Y.S. 267, 272 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1929). Although they could "[i]n
the exercise of a sound discretion ... entertain such jurisdiction where the necessities of
the case dictate," the general rule was that "considerations of policy as well as the true
interests of the parties dictate the pursuit of the litigation in the home forum." Id.
The rule most commonly applied left issues of fact for resolution by the jury. See
Lauth v. Pickup, 64 F.2d 115, 116 (2d Cir. 1933); Hussey v. Flanagan, 142 N.E. 594, 596
(N.Y. 1923); Thompson v. Mursten, 13 N.Y.S.2d 726, 727 (4th Dep't 1939); Logan v.
Turner, 189 N.Y.S. 415, 418 (1st Dep't 1921). But see Warsaw Elevator Co. v. Gucker,
258 N.Y.S. 984, 984 (4th Dep't 1932); Stemples v. Schwab, 218 N.Y.S. 284, 284 (3d
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39
deployed throughout the twentieth century in traditional sorts of cases.
The owner of property that had been converted was entitled to recover damages equal to the market value of the property 40 at the time and

Dep't 1926); Myers v. McAllister, 188 N.Y.S. 838, 839 (1st Dep't 1921); Zurlick v.
Stankus, 211 N.Y.S. 342, 346 (Sup. Ct. Columbia County 1925).
39. Such as suits over the ownership of stock, see Cooper v. North Jersey Trust
Co., 250 F. Supp. 237, 238 (S.D.N.Y. 1965); Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Walston
& Co., 234 N.E.2d 230, 232 (N.Y. 1967), reh'g denied, 238 N.E.2d 754, 754 (N.Y.
1968), suits involving commercial transactions in goods, see Armour & Co. v. Celic, 188
F. Supp. 700, 701 (E.D.N.Y. 1960); Fantis Foods, Inc. v. Standard Importing Co., 402
N.E.2d 122, 123 (N.Y. 1980); National Dairy Prod. Corp. v. Lawrence Am. Field Warehousing Corp., 255 N.Y.S.2d 788, 795 (1st Dep't 1965); Cutler-Hammer, Inc. v. Troy,
126 N.Y.S.2d 452, 453 (1st Dep't 1953); cf Camera Mart, Inc. v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas.
Co., 294 N.Y.S.2d 941, 943 (Civ. Ct. N.Y. County 1968) (suit on insurance policy), suits
over the ownership of chattels found among the effects of a decedent, see Bradley v. Roe,
27 N.E.2d 35, 36 (N.Y. 1940); In re Filipiak's Estate, 321 N.Y.S.2d 973, 974 (Sur. Ct.
Erie County 1971); In re Uis' Estate, 71 N.Y.S.2d 620, 621 (Sur. Ct. N.Y. County
1946), and suits over the rights of landlords, see Congregation Anshe Sefard, Inc. v. Title
Guarantee & Trust Co., 50 N.E.2d 534, 534-35 (N.Y. 1943); cf.Finkelstein v. Johnson,
337 N.Y.S.2d 887, 888 (1st Dep't 1972) (claim by tenant that landlord removed her TV
from premises), and creditors, see Win. H. Wise & Co. v. Rand McNally & Co., 195 F.
Supp. 621, 625 (S.D.N.Y. 1961); Korman v. R.H. Macy & Co., 142 N.Y.S.2d 455, 457
(Sup. Ct. Queens County 1955), to seize chattels. An attempt to expand trover to use it as
the vehicle for litigation over intangibles, such as a bakery route, failed, however. See
Stem v. Kaufinan's Bakery, Inc., 191 N.Y.S.2d 734, 735 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1959).
Another attempt to use trover failed in Bertolino v. Italian Line, 414 F. Supp. 279, 285
(S.D.N.Y. 1976), where the court found insufficient evidence in support of the plaintiff's
claim that defendant had misappropriated recording tapes given by plaintiff for private
use only.

40. See Halliday v. McGraw, 192 N.Y.S. 489, 491 (Sup. Ct. Erie County 1921).
However, "market value" was not "the exclusive measure" of damages, McAnamey v.
Newark Fire Ins. Co., 159 N.E. 902, 903 (N.Y. 1928), and a converter would never be
allowed to "escape liability simply because there [was] no market value or none of the
ordinary standards for measuring the damages," MacGregor v. Watts, 5 N.Y.S.2d 525,
526 (2d Dep't 1938). When household goods were converted, for instance, the owner was
not restricted to recovering "the price which could be realized by a sale in the market,"
but was granted "the value to him ... [under] all circumstances and conditions considered, ... not including, however, any sentimental or fanciful value." Lake v. Dye, 133
N.E. 448, 449 (N.Y. 1921); accord Weinstein v. Santini Transfer Co., 278 N.Y.S. 388,
392 (City Ct. Bronx County 1935); Taggart v. Granby, 286 N.Y.S. 382, 390-91 (Delaware County Ct. 1936). "[A]ctual value" was always the measure of damages, D. Apple-
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place of the conversion. 4 1 "The purpose of damages" was "to give the
injured party a full indemnity and no more"4--that is, to prevent any
redistribution of wealth to, or even from, the person guilty of conversion.43
C. Inducement of Breach of Contract
A third "actionable wrong" involving commercial harm, typically be' 4
tween business people, was "to procure breach of an existing contract.
As the Second Circuit explained, "contract fights [were] property, ...
[and] to induce one of the parties wrongfully to repudiate a contract

[was] as distinct a wrong as "a trespass or conversion, which "injure[d]
or destroy[ed] ...property. '45 The rule in New York, like the rule in
other jurisdictions, provided that "if one maliciously interferes with a
contract between two parties, and induces one of them to break that con-

ton Co. v. Zeese-Wilkinson Co., 251 N.Y.S. 532, 533 (1st Dep't 1931), although a successful plaintiff was also entitled to interest on the value of the property converted, see L.
Distillator & Son v. Smith, 249 N.Y.S. 525, 526 (N.Y. City Mun. Ct. 1931).
41. See Mitsubishi Shoji Kaisha, Ltd. v. Davis, 291 F. 57, 59 (2d Cir. 1923); Mallory S.S. Co. v. Mitchell, 291 F. 53, 54 (2d Cir. 1923); Filer v. Creole Syndicate, 245
N.Y.S. 367, 370 (1st Dep't 1930); accordGerman v. Snedeker, 13 N.Y.S.2d 237, 238
(1st Dep't 1939); Jeanette Doll Co. v. Cusmano, 199 N.Y.S. 751, 753 (1st Dep't 1923);
see also In re Salmon Weed & Co., 53 F.2d 335, 342 (2d Cir. 1931) (damages equal
greater of "market value of the stock at the time of the unauthorized hypothecation or the
highest intermediate value of the stock between notice of the conversion and a reasonable
time thereafter"); Satherwhite v. Harriman Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 13 F. Supp. 493, 497
(S.D.N.Y. 1935).
42. Rapid Machine Works, Inc. v. Silberstein, 241 N.Y.S. 68, 69 (City Ct. N.Y.
County 1930).
43. Thus the presumptive value of commercial paper was its face amount, B.C.S.
Corp. v. Colonial Discount Co., 8 N.Y.S.2d 65, 67 (City Ct. N.Y. County 1938), and of a
chattel, "[t]he price at which willing and uncompelled buyers and sellers meet," In re
Schuyler, Chadwick & Burnham, 63 F.2d 241, 243 (2d Cir. 1933); see also Zeppitella v.
Cappellino, 199 N.Y.S. 273, 274 (County Ct. Monroe County 1922) (replacement cost).
44. Second Nat'l Bank of Toledo v. M. Samuel & Sons, Inc., 12 F.2d 963, 967 (2d
Cir. 1926).
45. Id.
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other, the party injured can maintain an action
tract, to the injury of the
' 6
against the wrongdoer. "
Significant law developed around the doctrinal requirement of malice. By "maliciously," the courts normally did not "mean actual malice
or ill will," but merely that a defendant "without legal or social justification" and with "knowledge of an existing valid contract between others,
intentionally, [and] knowingly ... induce[d] one of the parties to the

contract to breach it.' ' 47 In contrast, mere "negligent interference with a
contract right [was] not a basis of liability, '

48

and thus no recovery could

46. Lamb v. S. Cheney & Son, 125 N.E. 817, 818 (N.Y. 1920); accordNew York
Trust Co. v. Island Oil & Transp. Corp., 34 F.2d 649, 652 (2d Cir. 1929); Haussmann v.
Colonial Trust Co., 23 F. Supp. 213, 214 (S.D.N.Y. 1938); Sklarsky v. Great Atlantic &
Pacific Tea Co., 47 F.2d 662, 665 (S.D.N.Y. 1931); General Out Door Adver. Co. v.
Hamilton, 278 N.Y.S. 226, 227 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1935). This was "a general rule
applicable to all contracts" and not merely to some special sort of contract, such as "contracts relating to services." Campbell v. Gates, 141 N.E. 914, 915 (N.Y. 1923). Upon
proper proof of facts, litigants thus had a right to recover damages against third parties
who had induced breach of all sorts of contracts, including contracts for the payment of
brokerage fees, see Axelrad v. 77 Park Ave. Corp., 234 N.Y.S. 27, 31 (1st Dep't 1929);
Weinberg v. Irvinessie Holding Corp., 232 N.Y.S. 443, 444-47 (2d Dep't 1929); Hornstein v. Podwitz, 173 N.E. 674, 675 (N.Y. 1930); cf. Clinchy v. Grandview Dairy, Inc.,
13 N.Y.S.2d 114, 115 (1st Dep't 1939), contracts to convey real estate to a plaintiff, see
Hansen v. Humphrey, 218 N.Y.S. 197, 199 (3d Dep't 1926) (dictum), contracts to supply
a plaintiff with products needed for resale in its business, see Atbrook Serv. Corp. v.
Sinclair Ref. Co., 268 N.Y.S. 830, 830-32 (1st Dep't 1934); Goodman Bros., Inc. v.
Ashton, 208 N.Y.S. 83, 84 (1st Dep't 1925) (dictum), contracts to market a product exclusively, see Gonzales v. Kentucky Derby Co., 189 N.Y.S. 783, 786 (2d Dep't 1921),
and contracts to lease space in a commercial facility, see Elk St. Mkt. Corp. v. Rothenberg, 251 N.Y.S. 259,264 (4th Dep't 1931); see also Jay Bee Apparel Stores, Inc. v. 563565 Main St. Realty Corp., 223 N.Y.S. 537, 541-42 (Sup. Ct. Erie County 1927) (right of
tenant to benefits of lease damaged by conduct of co-tenant in driving shoppers away).
Suit could also be brought to bar a defendant from soliciting customers on a list obtained
from an unfaithful employee of the plaintiff. See Conviser v. J.C. Brownstone & Co., 205
N.Y.S. 82, 88 (2d Dep't 1924).
47. Hornstein v. Podwitz, 173 N.E. 674, 675 (N.Y. 1930); accordSidney Blumenthal & Co. v. United States, 30 F.2d 247, 249 (2d Cir. 1929).
48. Lamport v. 4175 Broadway, Inc., 6 F. Supp. 923, 924 (S.D.N.Y. 1934); cf
Bencoe Exporting & Importing Co. v. Erie City Iron Works, 280 F. 690, 691 (2d Cir.
1922)
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be had, not even for significant business losses when, for example, a mo-

tion picture distributor shipped films by "mistake" in violation of a plaintiff' s exclusive territorial rights. 9
With the narrow exception of cases dealing with labor unions and efforts at labor organization, the New York courts did not treat the probability of obtaining an agreement or an agreement that was terminable
at will as a valid contract.5 ' In cases such as these, where there was only
a potential agreement or prospect of an agreement, no cause of action
existed unless actual malice or ill will could be shown. 2 Likewise, suit
for interference with contract rights would not lie5 if
for some other rea3
son a plaintiff lacked an enforceable contract right.
However, the principle of preventing redistribution of wealth led to
the development of radically different rules in cases involving labor unions and efforts at labor organization. Markedly different law applied, for
example, in the hotly contested 54 1920 case of Michaels v. Hillman,55
which arose out of organizational efforts of the Amalgamated Clothing

49. See Glucksman v. Gillespie, 204 N.Y.S. 354, 356 (lst Dep't 1924).
50. See Union Car Adv. Co. v. Collier, 189 N.E. 463, 469 (N.Y. 1934); Hamick v.
Avrum Realty Corp., 288 N.Y.S. 256, 259 (1st Dep't 1936); cf Burke v. Richmond, 228
N.Y.S. 172, 173-74 (Sup. Ct. Niagara County 1928) (party who was not lowest bidder
may not restrain public entity from entering into contract with another).
51. See VanWyck v. Mannino, 9 N.Y.S.2d 684, 686-87 (2d Dep't 1939); Biber
Bros. News Co. v. New York Evening Post, Inc., 258 N.Y.S. 31, 33-34 (Sup. Ct. Westchester County 1932); cf Arnold v. Burgess, 272 N.Y.S. 534, 535-38 (1st Dep't 1934)
(engineers who had customarily worked for members of association could not complain
when association changed its rules so that members no longer needed to employ them).
52. See Sidney Blumenthal & Co., 30 F.2d at 249.

53. See Williams v. Adams, 295 N.Y.S. 86, 92 (1st Dep't 1937); DuRoy & LeMaistre, Inc. v. Gillmore, 284 N.Y.S. 385, 391 (1st Dep't 1935); J. Walter Thompson Co. v.
Winchell, 278 N.Y.S. 781, 784-85 (1st Dep't 1935); King v. Krischner Mfg. Co., 222
N.Y.S. 66, 69 (1st Dep't 1927); Garcia Sugars Corp. v. New York Coffee & Sugar Exch.,
Inc., 7 N.Y.S.2d 532, 534-35 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1938).
54. See generallyMichaels v. Hillman, 183 N.Y.S. 195, 195-207 (Sup. Ct. Monroe
County 1920) (the importance of the case to the union was evidenced by the union's representation by Felix Frankfurter).
55. See id.
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Workers. Employers, according to the Michaels court, "had the right to
endeavor to keep their factory nonunion, ... which included the right to
request their employe[es] not to join an outside organization, and to discharge them for doing so."'5 6 Employees, of course, had the right to strike
or otherwise refuse to work, since the "right to discharge and the right to
quit work" were "reciprocal. 57 But the employees and their union, the
court added, could not "prevent" an employer "from filling with others
the places of those who left, and to cause those who remained at work to
leave the plaintiffs' employ."5 8 Any such acts would interfere with an
employer's right to enter into and enjoy the benefit of contracts, as well
as with "[t]he right to work" enjoyed by other workers.5 9 Attempts by
unions to interfere "savor[ed] of a species of domination which [did] not
inspire confidence in the ... ultimate purposes" of unions and which
called for the courts to "protect the general public ... from exaction and
oppression. ' 60 "The law," as the Michaels court concluded, was "opposed to all monopolies, whether of labor or capital," since "economic
... despotism ha[d] no more consideration for the general good than a
political despotism, and [was] an undue barrier to the exercise of perthe development of industries, and
sonal liberty and freedom of action,
61
life."
in
competition
reasonable
Cases decided within the next several months were consistent with
Michaels. One case, for example, declared unlawful any "conspiracy to
injure a person's business, by preventing persons from entering his employment by threats and intimidation., 62 It continued that any "purpose
of an organization or combination of workingmen ... to hamper or restrict" ... "freedom" in the citizen to pursue his lawful trade or calling

56. Id.at 197.
57. Id. at 198.
58. Id. at 199.
59. Id. at 200.
60. Id. at 202.
61. Id.
62. Grand Shoe Co., Inc. v. Children's Shoe Workers Union, 187 N.Y.S. 886, 888
(Sup. Ct. Kings County 1920).
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would be "against the spirit of our government and the nature of our
Constitution., 63 "[No organization or combination of workingmen ha[d]
the right to debar any individual or group of workers from employment,"
and every employer had "the right to employ whom it sees fit" and to
"make membership in ... unions... a bar to employment in its factory
.. even if it thereby makes collective bargaining impossible."" A final
case went even further and held unions "responsible for all lawlessness
growing out of strikes which they could have avoided by reasonable discipline imposed upon their members" and every member thereof "responsible65 for the acts of the others, and particularly for the acts of any
officer."
Labor unions derived little benefit from the fact that these expansive
doctrines prohibiting interference with merely prospective contract rights
applied to "combination[s] of employers" as well as those of employees
"who by coercive measures seek to break contracts between employer
and employee., 66 Employers in most industries had no need to enter into
combinations with each other or to use other mechanisms essential to
carrying on union activity. Formalistic statements that "the law does not
have one rule for the employer and another for the employee" meant
nothing when judges were speaking of a rule that, in fact, harmed employees significantly, but did nothing to hurt employers. 67 Even though
each case involving interference with contract rights was "to be decided
upon the same principles of law, impartially applied to the facts of the
case, irrespective of the personality of the litigants,, 68 expansive rules
prohibiting interference with a wide range of existing or prospective contracts conferred vast power upon entities like manufacturing firms possessing valuable contract rights, and little power on factory workers

63. Id.

64. Id. at 889.
65. United Traction Co. v. Droogan, 189 N.Y.S. 39, 41-42 (Sup. Ct. Albany
County 1921).
66. Schlesinger v. Quinto, 194 N.Y.S. 401,409 (lst Dep't 1922).

67. Id.
68. Id.
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whose only right was to labor for a pittance.
In contrast, courts were unwilling to extend doctrine in employment
contract cases where labor unions were not involved and hence there was
no danger of redistribution of wealth between social classes. As Judge
Learned Hand wrote, "it has never been thought actionable to take away
another's employee, when the defendant wants to use him in his own
business, however much the plaintiff may suffer., 6 9 An employee "was
free to resign... at will," and it was "difficult to see how servants could
get the full value of their services on any other terms., 70 Based on this
reasoning, the Second Circuit held that it was legitimate for a corporation
to entice away an officer of a competitor.71
Likewise, the courts would not extend doctrine in non-employment
cases, where extension also was not called for to protect existing wealth
distribution. For example, a party to a contract with a bankrupt corporation was not permitted to sue the bankrupt corporation's president at
whose instance the contract had been breached.72 Nor would the state
courts permit inducement of breach suits to be brought in noncommercial
cases. Thus, parents, friends, and even rivals were not liable for inducing
breach of a contract to marry,7 3 since "before entering upon that status,"
parties "should not be hindered in securing information and advice from
all sources." 74 Moreover, allowing such suits would "invite a deluge of

69. Restaurant Assoc. Indus. v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 422 F. Supp. 1105-11

(S.D.N.Y. 1976).
70. Harley & Lund Corp. v. Murray Rubber Co., 31 F.2d 932, 934 (2d Cir. 1929).
71.

See id.

72. See Osgood v. Talmadge, 45 F.2d 696, 697 (2d Cir. 1930). But cf Reiner v.
North Am. Newspaper Alliance, 181 N.E. 561, 562-63 (N.Y. 1932) (refusing to allow
news reporter to recover money promised him in return for fraudulently violating another
reporter's exclusive news rights).
73. See Ryther v. Lefferts, 250 N.Y.S. 699, 702 (1st Dep't 1931); Fredenburg v.
Fredenburg, 288 N.Y.S. 377, 380 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1936) (dictum); Stiffler v.
Boehm, 206 N.Y.S. 187, 187 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1924); Guida v. Pontrelli, 186
N.Y.S. 147, 149 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1921) (dictum).
74. Ryther, 250 N.Y.S. at 701 (lst Dep't 1931).
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like litigation.' 75 This second concern about "open[ing] our courts to a
flood of litigation that would inundate them" also provided the basis for
not allowing suit for interference with relationship by a child against a
man who had enticed his mother to leave her home 76and family with
whom she "had lived happily... for twenty-two years."
Other sorts of policy judgments induced courts to "leave the parties
where it found them" in marriage contract litigation. 7 One court, for example, refused to aid a woman in collecting $100,000 she had been
78
promised by one man if she breached her contract to marry another,
while another court dismissed a complaint alleging a conspiracy between
plaintiff's fianc6e and a pretended medium to cause her to marry "a titled
but otherwise unsatisfactory husband" on assurances that he would die
within six weeks.79 The court's reasoning was that plaintiff's "pretended
unconsummated marriage ...was as much an immoral act ...as any
act[s] of misrepresentation ...by the defendants" and thus had to "be
taken into consideration
before any legal sanction may be given to plain'°
tiff's claims.8
Subtle policy judgments that the law concerning inducement of
breach of contract should be expanded or contracted, as needed, to preserve the existing distribution of wealth also played a role in occasional
commercial cases. Thus, in Knapp v. Penfields ' the court allowed "an
elderly lady ...of high social position, great wealth, and culture," who
had advanced $250,000 to finance a Broadway production, to demand
that the producers fire a Miss America contest winner from the lead role.
The court held that although the Miss America winner was "[c]oncededly

75. Stiffler, 206 N.Y.S. at 188 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1924).
76. Morrow v. Yannantuono, 273 N.Y.S. 912, 913-14 (Sup. Ct. Westchester
County 1934).
77. Attridge v. Pembroke, 256 N.Y.S. 257, 261 (4th Dep't 1932) (dictum).
78. See id. at 259-61.
79. Popielawski v. Gimbel, 256 N.Y.S. 761, 762 (1st Dep't 1932).
80. Id.
81. 256 N.Y.S. 41, 42-44 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1932).
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of face, form, and figure, 82 she "was not equal to singing the
theme song or dancing as the heroine's part was originally cast." The
court found that the socialite's "investment" was "thus seriously impaired and jeopardized" and declared that persons like the socialite "acting for the protection of contract rights of their own which are of an
to another's contractual rights may invade the
equal or superior interest
83
latter with impunity."
Indeed, lower courts sometimes allowed even defendants who acted
with "a malicious motive" to invade contract rights of others if their invasion did not threaten the redistribution of wealth. Thus, in Beardsley v.
Kilmer,84 a defendant who acted to "get even ' 85 for published statements
made about him by the plaintiff was permitted to open a rival newspaper,
to induce plaintiff s employees to leave their jobs and go to work for the
defendant, and ultimately to drive the plaintiffs newspaper out of business. The explanation for this result was "that the right of competition
[was] self-justification always" in "a land of opportunity, as well as of
free competition in business," even though, as one dissenter noted, the
effect of the case would be to allow "a man who is wealthy enough and
malicious enough to shut the door of opportunity to the object of his hatred by rivaling
him in business, with no other aim in view than his de86
struction.,
The case that best revealed the flexibility of policy judgment was
Kelly v. CentralHanover Bank & Trust Co.,87 which was an attempt by
...fair

82. Id. at 42.
83. Id. at 43-44.

84. 193 N.Y.S. 285 (3d Dep't 1922).
85. Id. at 286 (quoting statement by Willis S. Kilmer to Guy W. Beardsley
(1903)).
dissenting); accord Carroll Bldg. Corp. v. Louis
86. Id. at 289-90 (Hinman, J.,
Greenberg Plumbing Supplies, Inc., 214 N.Y.S. 42, 44 (2d Dep't 1926); Almirall & Co.
v. McClement, 202 N.Y.S. 139, 147 (1st Dep't 1923); Brown v. Metropolitan News Co.,

267 N.Y.S. 623, 626 (Sup. Ct. Bronx County 1933); In re Curtiss' Will, 250 N.Y.S. 146,
150 (Sur. Ct. Steuben County 1931); see also Morgan v. Morgan, 221 N.Y.S. 117, 118
(1st Dep't 1927) (no cause of action against witness maliciously giving false testimony).
87. 11 F. Supp. 497, 500 (S.D.N.Y. 1935).
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debenture holders of the bankrupt Insull Utility Investments, Inc., to obtain equitable relief against five New York banks and the General Electric Company. These entities had accepted the debentures as security for
loans made to Insull in violation of restrictions contained in the debentures.8 8 The court agreed that the transaction constituted a breach of the
debenture holders' contract rights with Insull in which General Electric
and the New York banks had participated, but it also found that the six
defendants had not intentionally induced the breach. This finding brought
the court to the issue of whether to "create a liability in equity, based on
a knowing participation in, though not the inducing of a breach of conat law against the promisor is intract when, for that breach, the remedy
89
insolvency."
its
of
because
adequate,
Plaintiffs urged that "intentional interference with another's contractual rights... [was] a moral wrong" for which "equity should grant relief
even though in so doing it establishe[d] a higher standard of fair dealing
toward strangers than ha[d] been recognized in actions at law." 90 Nonetheless, the court, "find[ing] no compelling reason for relieving the debenture holders at the expense of General Electric," refused to extend
doctrine in the fashion sought by plaintiffs.9 1 Needless to say, the court
disapproved "of the issuance and sale to the general public of debentures
which might be thought to afford but which actually fail to give any real
protection to the purchasers. 92 In its view, "these and other practices, so
freely indulged in... during the so-called era of prosperity, undoubtedly
call[ed] for correction and prevention." 93 But, "legislation, state and federal," was the appropriate vehicle "to meet the evil," not the redistributo rely on" Insull's
tion of wealth from a creditor who was "unwilling
94
"unsecured promise" to one who had been willing.

88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.

See id.at 500-02.
Id. at 513.
Id.
Id. at 514.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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D. Fraud
The real difficulty with the practices of Insull and others "during the
so-called era of prosperity" prior to 1929 was that they amounted to
something akin to fraud-a subject that was the source of an immense
number of reported cases during the 1920s and 1930s. "The law [did] not
suffer deceit to be practiced by any trick or device,"9 5 and accordingly it
outlawed fraud, which it defined as any "breach of... trust[] or confidence[] justly reposed '96 or "as the gain of an advantage to another's detriment by deceitful or unfair means. 9 7 Consistent with this definition of
fraud as a species of illegitimate redistribution, courts held that a plaintiff
seeking to recover for fraud had to prove that a defendant "knowingly
made false representations as to material facts which deceived her and
98
induced [a] payment when otherwise it would not have been made."
Stated differently, the five "requisite[s] necessary to constitute the cause
of action [for fraud] ...[were] representations, falsity, scienter, deception and injury." 99 Significant case law developed around each of the five

95. Thorn v. Austin Silver Mining Co., 12 N.Y.S.2d 675, 678 (Sup. Ct. N.Y.
County 1939).
96. In re Gellis' Estate, 252 N.Y.S. 725, 733 (Sur. Ct. Kings County 1931) (quoting Richardson v. Trimble, 38 Hun 409, 416 (1st Dep't 1886) (quoting 1 JOSEPH STORY,
COMmNTARiES ON EQuITy JURISPRUDENCE § 187, at 201 (Fred B. Rothman & Co. 1988)
(Melville E. Bigelow ed., 13th ed. 1886) (punctuation omitted in original))).
97. In re DiCrocco's Estate, 12 N.Y.S.2d 276, 278 (Sur. Ct. Richmond County
1939); accord Gellis'Estate,252 N.Y.S. at 733.
98. Conde v. Towner, 15 N.Y.S.2d 265, 266 (3d Dep't 1939).
99. Id. (quoting Arthur v. Groswold, 55 N.Y. 400,410 (1874)); accordFord Motor
Co. v. Dexter, 51 F.2d 258, 260 (S.D.N.Y. 1931), rev'd on other grounds, 56 F.2d 760
(2d Cir. 1932); Seneca Wire & Mfg. Co. v. A.B. Leach & Co., 159 N.E. 700, 702 (N.Y.
1928); Karscher v. Dewald, 284 N.Y.S. 213, 214 (1st Dep't 1935); Smith v. Onondaga
Pottery Co., 300 N.Y.S. 298, 301-02 (Sup. Ct. Onondaga County 1937); Fahnestock v.
Clark Henry Corp., 272 N.Y.S. 49, 58 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1934); Hull v. Cohen, 252
N.Y.S. 153, 157 (Sup. Ct. Monroe County 1931); Continental Ins. Co. v. Mereadante,
212 N.Y.S. 756, 758 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1925); Hobaica v. Byrne, 205 N.Y.S. 7, 9-10
(Sup. Ct. Oneida County 1924); McClester v. F-I-F Plan Corp., 12 N.Y.S.2d 307, 310
(N.Y. City Mun. Ct. 1939); Yaswen v. Pollock, 280 N.Y.S. 512, 518 (N.Y. City Mun. Ct.
1934).
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requirements.

To be actionable, fraudulent representations had to "consist of statements as to existing facts rather than expressions of opinion[,] ... promises of things to be done or performed in the future," 100 or "dealer's
talk."10 1 "Disappointed hopes," according to the New York Court of Appeals, could "not [be] the basis of legal liability"102 because, "[i]f they
100. Electric Paint & Varnish Co. v. Binghamton Woven Wire Spring Co., 236
N.Y.S. 337, 338 (Sup. Ct. Broome County 1929); accord Yaswen, 280 N.Y.S. at 518.
101. Bareham & McFarland, Inc. v. Kane, 240 N.Y.S. 123, 126 (4th Dep't 1930).
Representations, for example, that certain land or stock had a "true and actual value,"
O'Hara v. Derschug, 272 N.Y.S. 189, 192 (4th Dep't 1934) (quoting plaintiff's complaint); see also Goess v. Lucinda Shops, Inc., 93 F.2d 449,451 (2d Cir. 1937); Carney v.
Morrison, 228 N.Y.S. 308, 312 (lstDep't 1928), or that a mortgage was "good security,"
Benz v. Kaderbeck, 272 N.Y.S. 558, 561 (4th Dep't 1934), were held to be opinions,
although statements that a firm had "only [specified] outstanding agreements," Coon v.
Ikeler, 212 N.Y.S. 330, 333 (2d Dep't 1925), that a particular utility classification would
enable a business to save money, see Stem Bros., Inc. v. New York Edison Co., 296
N.Y.S. 857, 859 (1st Dep't 1937), or that a business was " 'financially responsible and
fully capable of carrying out ... [its] obligations' ... was not the utterance of a mere
opinion or prophesy [sic]," Duncan v. Stoneham, 170 N.E. 571, 571 (N.Y. 1930) (per
curiam) (quoting letter from appellants Charles A. Stonham and Ross E. Robertson to
plaintiff John Duncan). Representations about New York law were opinions, see DeFranco v. Shedden, 295 N.Y.S. 370, 371 (2d Dep't 1937); Lefferts v. Lefferts, 276 N.Y.S
809, 812 (1st Dep't 1935); C.I.T. Corp. v. Daley, 257 N.Y.S. 163, 164 (Sup. Ct. N.Y.
County 1932); Bodenstein v. Singer, 209 N.Y.S. 748, 749 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1925),
although statements about the law of other jurisdictions were facts, see In re Miller's
Will, 295 N.Y.S. 943, 957-58 (Sur. Ct. Kings County 1937), as were statements about the
nonexistence of easements over land in New York, see Acunto v. Wiggins, 279 N.Y.S.
568, 568 (2d Dep't 1935); Acunto v. Wiggins, 252 N.Y.S. 844, 844 (2d Dep't 1931). The
courts were divided over whether a representation as to safety made by a defendant who
knew of the existence of danger was a fact or opinion. Compare Daurizio v. Merchants'
Despatch Transp. Co., 274 N.Y.S. 174, 181 (Sup. Ct. Monroe County 1934) (declining to
find fraud because the cause of action for fraud was redundant to the cause of action for
negligence), with Macomber v. Wilkinson, 6 N.Y.S.2d 608, 613 (Rochester City Ct.
1938) (interpreting the pleading liberally to state sufficient facts to sustain an action for
fraud). As one judge observed, "[n]o hard and fast rule [could] be laid down as to what
constitute[d] a fraudulent representation in any particular case," with the "result, of necessity, depend[ing] upon the peculiar circumstances and conditions involved." Bareham
& McFarland,Inc., 240 N.Y.S. at 127.
102. Adams v. Clark, 146 N.E. 642,644 (N.Y. 1925).
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were, no one, without making himself liable for damages, could innocently and in good faith say that he would advance money in aid of an
... enterprise.... ,103 Therefore, considerations connected with the
smooth operation of business constrained the judiciary's capacity to pro-

vide maximum protection of the existing distribution of wealth.

103. Id. Thus, promises to repay money, see Trieper v. Bulkley & Horton Co., 197
N.Y.S. 88, 89 (2d Dep't 1922); Hadley v. Thompson, 12 N.Y.S.2d 258, 259 (Sup. Ct.
N.Y. County 1939), to refrain from entering a judgment, see Herzberg v. Farmers' Nat'l
Bank, 276 N.Y.S. 510, 512 (3d Dep't 1935), to extend a lease, see Polscik v. Korff, 180
N.Y.S. 401, 402 (1st Dep't 1920), to complete a contract within a specified time, see
Crossways Apartment Corp. v. Amante, 210 N.Y.S. 346, 352-53 (1st Dep't 1925), to put
an automobile "in first-class running order," John N. Benedict Co. v. McKeage, 195
N.Y.S. 228, 229 (3d Dep't 1922) (quoting testimony of Willis D. Sweet to statement
made by defendant Guillaume R. McKeage), and to give dower to a wife, see Browning
v. Browning, 243 N.Y.S. 322, 326 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1930), without more, were not
fraudulent. "The fraudulent breach of a contract [did] not give rise to an action for fraud."
Drydock Knitting Mills, Inc. v. Queens Mach. Corp., 2 N.Y.S.2d 717, 718 (2d Dep't
1938). However, it was "well settled that a declaration of a present intention, false when
made, to perform an act in the future, constitute[d] a false representation of an existing
fact" and thus amounted to a predicate for an action of fraud. Pease & Elliman, Inc. v.
Wegeman, 229 N.Y.S. 398, 400 (1st Dep't 1928); accordKnickerbocker Merchandising
Co. v. United States, 13 F.2d 544, 545-46 (2d Cir. 1926); Fowler-Curtis Co. v. Dean, 196
concurring); Eichom v. Serlis & Co., 192
N.Y.S. 750, 754 (3d Dep't 1922) (Kellogg, J.,
N.Y.S. 797, 798 (1st Dep't 1922); Fahnestock v. Clark Henry Corp., 272 N.Y.S. 49, 58
(Sup. Ct. Kings County 1934). Thus, promises to pay or return money, see Columbian
Laundry v. Hencken, 196 N.Y.S. 523, 526-27 (1st Dep't 1922), to provide financing, see
Moore v. Abbey, 210 N.Y.S. 766, 767 (4th Dep't 1925), to refrain from entering a judgment see McMullen v. Michigan Home Furnishing Corp., 232 N.Y.S. 124, 125 (1st
Dep't 1928), to reconvey property after foreclosure upon the execution of a new mortgage, see Lipkind v. Ward, 8 N.Y.S.2d 832, 835 (3d Dep't 1939); Eagle v. Cherney, 1
N.Y.S.2d 513, 514 (3d Dep't 1938); cf.Weiner v. Jones, 279 N.Y.S. 799, 800 (4th Dep't
1935) (reversing lower court's finding of fraud via giving worthless check to sheriff to
induce him not to levy execution, on the grounds that the extent of the fraud was not
proven), to act in some specified manner in regard to a lease, see Slonemsky v. Zevin,
267 N.Y.S. 589, 591 (1st Dep't 1933); Scaroon Manor Operating Corp. v. W.P. & L.
Realty Corp., 241 N.Y.S. 229, 231 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1930); Belmont-Hughes Realty
Corp. v. Denison, 219 N.Y.S. 216, 216-17 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1926), and to make
improvements to real property in return for a third mortgage, see Penner v. Weissblatt,
239 N.Y.S. 241, 243 (N.Y. City Ct. Bronx County 1930), when made with an intention
not to perform them, did amount to fraud.
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In order for a misrepresentation of fact to be actionable, it also had to
fulfill the second requirement of falsity.1°4 "The gist" of fraud was "producing a false impression upon the mind of the other party." ' Even a
person who was "entitled to keep silent" was "bound to disclose the

whole truth" if that person "volunteer[ed] any information at all"; "a partial statement [would be] a fraudulent concealment... if it [gave] a false
color to the whole... ."106 For example, an accountant who prepared a
balance sheet could not "escape all liability by insisting that the balance
sheet ...reflect[ed] the condition of the books ...correctly," when it
"did not correctly reflect the condition of the company ...,107 Likewise,
a bank had a duty "to speak carefully" in response to any inquiry about a
customer's account when it "undertook to speak at all."' 0 8 Indeed, one
court went as far as to hold that the "doctrine of caveat emptor [did] not
apply" and that a seller was under a duty to disclose facts "peculiarly
104. See Cooper v. Weissblatt, 277 N.Y.S. 709, 713 (2d Dep't 1935); Abel v. Patemo, 274 N.Y.S. 749, 754 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1934), rev'd on other grounds, 281
N.Y.S. 58 (1st Dep't 1935); cf Vesell v. Reisfield, 273 N.Y.S. 778, 780 (N.Y. City Mun.
Ct. 1934) (requirement of"delictum").
105. Noved Realty Corp. v. A.A.P. Co., 293 N.Y.S. 336, 341 (1st Dep't 1937)
(quoting Stewart v. Wyoming Cattle Ranche [sic] Co., 128 U.S. 383, 388 (1888)). It was
"unimportant whether the means of accomplishing it [were] words or acts of the defendant[s]," id. (second alteration in original), such as a notary public's taking of a false
acknowledgment see Kainz v. Goldsmith, 246 N.Y.S. 582, 584 (1st Dep't 1930), or the
defendant's "concealment or suppression of material facts," he was under a duty to disclose, Noved Realty, 293 N.Y.S. at 341 (quoting Stewart v. Wyoming Cattle Ranch Co.,
128 U.S. 383,388 (1888)). Butsee James Mills Orchards Corp. v. Frank, 244 N.Y.S. 473,
482 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1930); President and Dirs. of Manhattan Co. v. Tunick, 237
N.Y.S. 230, 234 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1929) (holding no fraud occurs when defendant
conceals facts which he has no duty to disclose).
106. Costello v. Costello, 279 N.Y.S. 303, 310 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1934)

(quoting 1 BLAC K ON RESCISSION AD

CANCELLATiON

§ 63); cf The Kalfarli, 277 F. 391,

400-01 (2d Cir. 1921) (holding that a person introduced as agent has a duty to disclose
fact when he ceases to act as agent).
107. State St. Trust Co. v. Ernst, 15 N.E.2d 416,419 (N.Y. 1938).
108. Anchor Lumber Corp. v. Manufacturer's Trust Co., 272 N.Y.S. 610, 610 (2d
Dep't 1934); cf First Citizens Bank & Trust Co. v. Sherman's Estate, 294 N.Y.S. 131,
139 (4th Dep't 1937) (holding that bank has duty to disclose to one undertaking to become surety).
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within his knowledge" whenever a "purchaser [did] not have equal information." 109
The third requirement of scienter or "fraudulent intent [was] the gist"
of fraud,110 and, absent proof of scienter, there could be no recovery."'
Normally proof of scienter required the showing of "a willful purpose
resorted to with intent to deprive another of his legal rights"' 12 or of

"some act, consciously or purposely done, which [was] inconsistent with
an honest purpose."'1 13 This requirement of intent meant that, in transfer-

109. Hall v. Grays, 238 N.Y.S. 67, 69-70 (3d Dep't 1929).
110. Ritz Carlton Apartments, Inc. v. Fried, 232 N.Y.S. 519, 520 (N.Y. City Mun.
Ct. 1929); accordO'Connor v. Ludlam, 92 F.2d 50, 53-54 (2d Cir. 1937).
111. See Banner v. Lyon & Healy, Inc., 293 N.Y.S. 236, 238 (1st Dep't 1937);
Clark v. Standard Rock Asphalt Corp., 253 N.Y.S. 730, 733 (1st Dep't 1931); Stoller v.
Block Realty Co., 227 N.Y.S. 731, 732 (1st Dep't 1928).
112. People v. Photocolor Corp., 281 N.Y.S. 130, 136 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County
1935) (quoting Reno v. Bull, 226 N.Y. 546, 551 (1919), reargumentdenied, 227 N.Y.
591 (1919)); accordVanSwall v. Derschug, 257 N.Y.S. 206, 207 (4th Dep't 1932); Bulkley v. Rouken Glen, Inc., 226 N.Y.S. 544, 550 (2d Dep't 1928); Deyo v. Hudson, 181
N.Y.S. 846, 849 (3d Dep't 1920); Coppo v. Coppo, 297 N.Y.S. 744, 750 (Sup. Ct.
Dutchess County 1937); In re Solomon's Estate, 287 N.Y.S. 814, 819 (Sur. Ct. Kings
County 1936); Chaddock v. Chaddock, 226 N.Y.S. 152, 156-57 (Sup. Ct. Onondaga
County 1927). A defendant could be liable for fraud even though "he [did] not intend to
defraud any particular person, and [did] not realize the exact consequences that [would]
flow from his act." Habeeb v. Daas, 181 N.Y.S. 392, 394 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1920).
113. Brockton Shoe Mfg. Co. v. Schenkman, 261 N.Y.S. 740, 741 (1st Dep't
1932). The scienter requirement could also be met by "the pretense of knowledge when
knowledge there [was] none," Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 174 N.E. 441, 444 (N.Y.
1931); accord Church v. Wickwire, 247 N.Y.S. 100, 106-07 (1st Dep't 1931); Owens v.
Waterhouse, 233 N.Y.S. 535, 538 (4th Dep't 1929), or by a "representation made recklessly, heedless of its truth or falsity," Thompson v. Thompson, 235 N.Y.S. 617, 621
(Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1929), rev'd on other grounds, 250 N.Y.S. 433 (lstDep't 1931);
accord Bentel v. United States, 13 F.2d 327, 329 (2d Cir. 1926); UltramaresCorp., 174
N.E. at 448-49; First Nat. Bank v. Level Club, Inc., 272 N.Y.S. 273, 284 (1st Dep't
1934); see also Doyle v. Chatham & Phenix Nat. Bank, 171 N.E. 574, 577-78 (N.Y.
1930), reh'g denied, 173 N.E. 860 (N.Y. 1930) (holding that holder could not recover
damages for fraud from trustee certifying bonds, where there was no intent to defraud,
but recognizing that there could be liability for damages resulting from negligent words).
Even a representation that was "innocent in its inception" would satisfy the scienter requirement if it later "[lost] its innocent character." Dodds v. McColgan, 235 N.Y.S. 492,
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ring money from one entrepreneur to another, courts would merely be

returning the money to its true owner from whom it had been wrongfully
misappropriated.
The fourth element "essential to constitute a fraud [was] that the
means used should be successful in deceiving." ' 1 4 "To maintain an action

in fraud," a plaintiff had to "prove she relied upon the fraudulent statements"' 1 5 of a sort that would mislead a reasonable person-that the
fraudulent statements were "material."' 1 6 However, it was "no excuse for

a culpable misrepresentation that [the] means of probing it were at
hand!"1 7 and that a plaintiff was contributorily negligent for failing to
499 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1929), aff'd, 241 N.Y.S. 584 (lst Dep't 1930). But a merely
negligent representation would never suffice in the absence of an affirmative duty to give
correct information. See Courteen Seed Co. v. Hong Kong & Shanghai Banking Corp.,
157 N.E. 272,274 (N.Y. 1927), reargumentdenied, 159 N.E. 641 (N.Y. 1927).
114. Goldstein v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y, 289 N.Y.S. 1064, 1067 (City
Ct. N.Y. County 1936) (quoting HANOVER ON THE LAW OF HoRSEs 156 (2d ed. 1875));
accord Green v. Victor Talking Mach. Co., 24 F.2d 378, 380 (2d Cir. 1928); Continental
Ins. Co. v. Mercadante, 225 N.Y.S. 488, 494 (1st Dep't 1927).
115. Agatowski v. Novinsky, 208 N.Y.S. 514, 518 (N.Y. City Mun. Ct. 1925); accordFireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Leventhal, 197 N.Y.S. 851, 851 (1st Dep't 1923); Gould
v. Flato, 10 N.Y.S.2d 361, 366 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1938).
116. Day v. Horton, 225 N.Y.S. 358, 359 (3d Dep't 1927); accord Odell v. Bamaby, 191 N.Y.S. 941, 941 (2d Dep't 1921); Commercial Credit Corp. v. Third & Lafayette Sts. Garage, 228 N.Y.S. 166, 170 (Sup. Ct. Erie County 1928). Thus, a plaintiff who
acted prior to a misrepresentation, see Sindeband v. Stone & Webster Eng'g Corp., 269
N.Y.S. 732, 732-33 (lst Dep't 1934); Pacific Bank v. Worth, 226 N.Y.S. 184, 187-88 (1st
Dep't 1927); cf. Alexander v. Quality Leather Goods Corp., 269 N.Y.S. 499, 503 (Sup.
Ct. N.Y. County 1934) (holding that purchaser of stock after fraud not liable to other
victims of fraud), or simply performed an act "she was bound to do," Herrmann v. Glens
Falls Indem. Co., 7 N.Y.S.2d 392, 392 (2d Dep't 1938); cf. Dwelle-Kaiser Co. v. Aetna
Cas. & Sur. Co., 150 N.E. 517, 518-19 (N.Y. 1926) (holding that failure to disclose insolvency during pendency of work did not constitute fraud), could not claim fraud. Likewise, a plaintiff who acquiesced in an alleged fraud, as by purchasing a car with an engine that he had heard knocking, see P. & M. Motor Car Co. v. Paris, 185 N.Y.S. 835,
836 (1st Dep't 1921), was held to waive any claim of fraud. See Stewart v. Edgecomb, 6
N.Y.S.2d 563, 565 (Sup. Ct. Broome County 1938); Hoffman v. Crittenden, 248 N.Y.S.
373, 374-75 (Sup. Ct. Monroe County 1931).
117. Albert v. Title Guarantee & Trust Co., 14 N.E.2d 625, 626 (N.Y. 1938); accordEufemia v. Moan, 206 N.Y.S. 185, 186 (2d Dep't 1923) (per curiam).
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pursue them. 118 "When the parties [did] not have equal means of knowledge, it [was] immaterial that the victim, if more suspicious, could have
discovered the cheat."'1 19
The fifth and final element of any cause of action for fraud was damage. It was "essential ... [to] show that the damage was caused by the
fraud alleged., 120 Thus, a woman who was cut by fragments of a safety-

glass windshield that broke in an automobile collision could not recover
for her injuries on the basis of excessive representations made about the

glass's safety, since she could not prove that she would have bought a
safer windshield-because nothing safer was available at that time--or

that she would not have taken the trip on which her injury occurred if she
had known the true facts about the glass. The "proximate cause" of her
injuries "was the collision," and the "only loss due to reliance on the de-

fendant's representations was the $10" extra paid for the safety glass
rather than for the regular glass windshield. 121 Similarly, a director of a

bank could not maintain a fraud claim against the bank for falsely informing him that its shares were more valuable than they actually
were. 1 The court reasoned that "the bank owed no ... duty to its direc118. See Angerosa v. White Co., 290 N.Y.S. 204,211 (4th Dep't 1936); Yedlin v.
Rubin, 220 N.Y.S. 545, 548 (2d Dep't 1927); Insurance Co. of North America v. Whitlock, 214 N.Y.S. 697, 704 (1st Dep't 1926); Vihart v. Broadway Dev. Corp., 188 N.Y.S.
475, 476 (1st Dep't 1921); People v. S.W. Straus & Co., 285 N.Y.S. 648, 672 (Sup. Ct.
Kings County 1936). But see Doorly v. Gleeson & Dolan Dev. Corp., 10 N.Y.S.2d 309,
310 (1st Dep't 1939).
119. Falter v. United States, 23 F.2d 420, 424 (2d Cir. 1928). Obviously the distinction between waiver of fraud and knowledge of facts that would make a party merely
contributorily negligent in not making further inquiry was "too uncertain and variable to
be compressed within a formula" and had to "be determined by the trier of the facts in the
light of all the circumstances." Walter v. Laidlaw, 162 N.E. 580, 581 (N.Y. 1928).
120. Stem v. Andrew, 291 N.Y.S. 333, 335 (1st Dep't 1936); accordWilliams v.
Sawyer Bros., Inc., 45 F.2d 700, 702-03 (2d Cir. 1930); Kraus v. General Motors Corp.,
27 F. Supp. 537, 540 (S.D.N.Y. 1939); McVea v. George, 210 N.Y.S. 742, 743 (4th
Dep't 1925); Weiner v. Fine, 189 N.Y.S. 164, 165 (1st Dep't 1921); Hermann v. Hart,
183 N.Y.S. 220, 222 (1st Dep't 1920); In re St. John's Estate, 296 N.Y.S. 613, 621 (Sur.
Ct. Kings County 1937).
121. Rachlin v. Libby-Owens-Ford Glass Co., 96 F.2d 597, 600 (2d Cir. 1938).
122. See Goess v. Ehret, 85 F.2d 109, 110 (2d Cir. 1936).
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tors" to inform them of its financial condition; "so far as there was any
[duty], it ran in the opposite direction." 123 Directors might "often enough
[be] dummies" with no real role in corporate management, but when they

"choose to assume positions of trust and responsibility" they could not
later have "the effrontery to make [their] neglect the basis of a claim

against [their] victim.' ' 124 Such dummy directors were the cause of their
own injury.
Fraud could "not be presumed" or "based merely on suspicion, conjecture, or doubtful inference." 125 A party claiming fraud had to "aver,
12 6
fully and explicitly," all five elements "constituting the alleged fraud,"
and all five elements thereafter had to "be established by clear and convincing factual proof." 12 7 These rules were somewhat relaxed, however,

123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Lowendahl v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 287 N.Y.S. 62, 76 (1st Dep't 1936); accord Winters v. Municipal Capital Corp., 26 F. Supp. 330, 333 (E.D.N.Y. 1939); Titterington v. Colvin, 1 N.E.2d 116, 116 (N.Y. 1936); Winter v. Anderson, 275 N.Y.S. 373,
379 (4th Dep't 1934); Waggoner v. Jageacks, 272 N.Y.S. 182, 186 (4th Dep't 1934);
Pitcher v. Sutton, 264 N.Y.S. 488, 490 (4th Dep't 1933); Steinberg v. New York Life Ins.
Co., 264 N.Y.S. 399, 402 (3d Dep't 1933); Burstein v. Cohen, 188 N.Y.S. 812, 812 (1st
Dep't 1921); Metropolitan Commercial Corp. v. Larkin Co., 4 N.Y.S.2d 326, 333 (Sup.
Ct. Erie County 1936); Woolson v. Waite, 286 N.Y.S. 619, 623-24 (Sup. Ct. Oswego
County 1935); 154 West Fourteenth Street Co. v. D.A. Schulte, Inc., 202 N.Y.S. 737,
743-44 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1923); Hopfan v. Knauth, 282 N.Y.S. 219, 224 (N.Y. City
Mun. Ct. 1935); In re Timko's Will, 270 N.Y.S. 323, 327 (Sur. Ct. Kings County 1934);
Kamaran v. Sidney Garage, Inc., 244 N.Y.S. 337, 340 (N.Y. City Mun. Ct. 1930).
126. Finsilver v. Still, 269 N.Y.S. 9, 11 (1st Dep't 1934) (quoting Butler v. Viele,
44 Barb. 166, 169 (General Term Monroe Co. 1864)). Pleadings were held sufficient in
Parisv. Smith, 270 F. 65, 67 (2d Cir. 1920), Abrams v. Roseth Corp., 292 N.Y.S. 445,
445 (1st Dep't 1937), Ruckstuhl, v. Healy, 225 N.Y.S. 570, 583 (1st Dep't 1927), Cross
v. Sylvia Silk Co., 225 N.Y.S. 552, 554 (1st Dep't 1927), and McConkey Realty Corp. v.
Wildermuth, 212 N.Y.S. 216, 217 (4th Dep't 1925), but insufficient in Belding Hemingway Co. v. Slater Mills, Inc., 289 N.Y.S. 1062, 1063 (1st Dep't 1936), Popper v. Korn,
218 N.Y.S. 631, 632 (2d Dep't 1926), and Hilgers v. Gosselin, 179 N.Y.S. 703, 704 (Ist
Dep't 1920).
127. Lowendahl, 287 N.Y.S. at 76; accord Union Switch & Signal Co. v. Day, 16
F.2d 4, 6 (2d Cir. 1926); In re Locust Bldg. Co., 299 F. 756, 765-77 (2d Cir. 1924);
Lynch v. Gibson, 3 N.Y.S.2d 672, 675 (1st Dep't 1938); Wilmerding v. O'Brien, 268
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"in cases where a fiduciary relation exist[ed] between the parties to a
transaction."1 28 When one party was "a dominant and controlling force
over the other" and "the superior party" thereby "obtain[ed] a possible
benefit, equity raise[d] a presumption against the validity of the proceed... upon such party the burden of proving its honesty and
ing, and cast
129
integrity.

N.Y.S. 206, 212 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1933); Harmon Nat'l Real Estate Corp. v. Swanson, 277 N.Y.S. 254, 257 (N.Y. City Mun. Ct. 1935); In re Decker's Estate, 268 N.Y.S.
280, 286 (Sur. Ct. Chenango County 1933). "Where evidence [was] equally as consistent
with innocence as with wrongdoing, the innocent construction [had to] be adopted."
Ochenkowski v. Dunaj, 251 N.Y.S. 589, 591 (3d Dep't 1931); see also Balboa Realty
County v. Brenglass Realty Corp., 264 N.Y.S. 287, 289 (Sup. Ct. Bronx County 1932);
Utterback-Gleason Co. v. Standard Acc. [sic] Ins. Co., 179 N.Y.S. 836, 842 (Sup. Ct.
Albany County 1920). Of course, "the burden of proving fraud [was] upon the person
asserting it." In re Fohnsbee's Estate, 268 N.Y.S. 309, 310 (Sur. Ct. Saratoga County
1933); accordLynch v. Gibson, 3 N.Y.S.2d 672, 677 (1st Dep't 1938); Polachek v. New
York Life Ins. Co., 263 N.Y.S. 230, 236 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1933); Smith v. Vara,
241 N.Y.S. 202, 210 (County Ct. Erie County 1930); Hotaling v. A.B. Leach & Co., 214
N.Y.S. 452,457 (N.Y. City Mun. Ct. 1926).
128. Frick v. Cone, 290 N.Y.S. 592, 602 (Sup. Ct Genesse County 1936), aff'd,
298 N.Y.S. 173 (4th Dep't 1937).
129. In re Smith's Estate, 276 N.Y.S. 646, 652 (4th Dep't 1935); accordIn re Marine Trust Co., 281 N.Y.S 553, 556-57 (Sup. Ct. Erie County 1935); Polachek, 263
N.Y.S. at 236; In re Hearn's Will, 285 N.Y.S. 935, 942 (Sur. Ct. Kings County 1936).
See also Titterington v. Colvin, 1 N.E. 116, 116 (N.Y. 1936). Before such a shift of the
burden of proof would occur, the party claiming fraud was required to prove the existence of a fiduciary relationship. See In re Donnelly's Estate, 283 N.Y.S. 609, 613 (Sur.
Ct. Kings County 1935). Evidence of fraud typically raised a question of fact for a jury.
See Chemuchin v. Kalmanoff, 292 N.Y.S. 71, 71 (2d Dep't 1936); Pruszynski v. Nowy
Swiat Pub. Co., 290 N.Y.S. 457, 457-58 (2d Dep't 1936); Dutcher v. Decker, 289 N.Y.S.
21, 22 (3d Dep't 1936); Titterington v. Colvin, 278 N.Y.S. 944, 945 (2d Dep't 1935);
Berlin Const. Co. v. Hoops, 183 N.Y.S. 121, 124 (1st Dep't 1920). Most jury verdicts
were upheld when challenged, see e.g., Prescottv. O'Donohue, 130 N.E. 914, 914 (N.Y.
1921); William H. Haws Clay Prods. Co. v. Smith, 289 N.Y.S. 61, 62 (3d Dep't 1936);
City of New York v. Flatto, 284 N.Y.S. 199, 203-04 (1st Dep't 1935); Urdang v. Posner,
222 N.Y.S. 396 (1st Dep't 1927); cf. Manfacturers'FinanceCorp. v. George W. Wood,

Inc., 221 N.Y.S. 387, 388-89 (1st Dep't 1927); Trojanorsky v. Boccafogli, 212 N.Y.S. 89,
94 (Ist Dep't 1925); Antonacchio v. ConsolidatedForeignExch. Corp., 197 N.Y.S. 150,

155 (1st Dep't 1922), for cases which reversed decisions of trial judges to dismiss suits
by plaintiffs prior to submission to the jury. For cases upholding the fact-finding powers
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A victim of fraud had alternative remedies, which where either to
"rescind the contract absolutely and ... recover the consideration parted
with,',130 or to "retain what he has received and bring an action at law to

recover the damages sustained."''

The victim, however, could "not do

of trial judges when they were sitting in lieu of juries, see Payne v. Scholnick, 12
N.Y.S.2d 242, 242 (4th Dep't 1939); Williamson v. Casa-Eguia,234 N.Y.S. 449, 450-53
(4th Dep't 1929); People v. S.W. Strauss & Co., 282 N.Y.S. 972, 981 (Sup. Ct. Kings
County 1935). There were some cases in which verdicts were set aside. See Smith v.
Cohen, 175 N.E. 361, 362 (N.Y. 1931); Kreitzman v. Indemnity Ins. Co., 15 N.Y.S.2d 25,
26 (1st Dep't 1939); Cacicedo v. McAteer, 221 N.Y.S. 60, 63 (1st Dep't 1927); Remington Arms Co. v. Cotton, 180 N.Y.S. 486. 494 (lst Dep't 1920); Taylor v. Manning, 179
N.Y.S. 827, 829 (2d Dep't 1920); Levy v. Horsfall, 179 N.Y.S. 564, 566 (1st Dep't
1920); cf Hildebrandv. Franklin-Wright Co., 295 N.Y.S. 653, 654 (3d Dep't 1937);
Green v. Krongold, 248 N.Y.S. 760, 761 (2d Dep't 1931); Allen v. Pellegrino, 9
N.Y.S.2d 945, 946-47 (1st Dep't 1939); Soilson v. Nemeth, 184 N.Y.S. 627, 628 (lst
Dep't 1920); and Blumberg v. Romer, 5 N.Y.S.2d 352 (Chenango County Ct. 1938), for
cases reversing fact findings. Other issues arising in fraud cases included the legal relationship of principals and agents, see Saville v. Sweet, 254 N.Y.S. 768, 770-71 (1st Dep't
1932); GraniteBond & Mortgage Corp. v. Hutchins, 233 N.Y.S. 404, 405-06 (4th Dep't
1929); Fay v. Moehlenpah, 242 N.Y.S. 618, 620 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1930); Gruas v.
FortoulFilm Corp., 182 N.Y.S. 28, 29-30 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1920); the validity of
releases obtained by fraud, see Stoeve v. Schinasi, 258 N.Y.S. 145, 146-47 (1st Dep't
1932); and the effect upon fraud suits by spouses of legislation abolishing civil actions
for alienation of affections, seduction, and breach of contract to marry, see Snyder v.
Snyder, 14 N.Y.S.2d 815, 816 (Sup. Ct. Bronx County 1939).
130. A plaintiff who elected to rescind for fraud would recover back any consideration that had been paid, plus interest, but could not recover any incidental damages.
See Weigel v. Cook, 142 N.E. 444, 446 (N.Y. 1923). Consequential damages, on the
other hand, were recoverable, and thus a produce merchant who was fraudulently sold
refrigeration equipment could both rescind the contract of sale and recover the value of
its spoiled produce. See Waldman Produce, Inc. v. Frigidaire Corp., 284 N.Y.S. 167, 171
(2d Dep't 1935). Moreover, in an action for rescission brought in equity, if it appeared
that "rescission ha[d] become impossible, as distinguished from improper," the chancellor could "grant money damages ...in order to prevent a failure of justice." First Nat'l
Bank v. Level Club, Inc., 4 N.Y.S.2d 734, 740 (1st Dep't 1938); cf.Scopano v. United
States Gypsum Co., 3 N.Y.S.2d 300, 302 (Sup. Ct. Genesee County 1938) (damage claim
may be joined in equity action to set aside judgment procured by fraud); accordFitzgerald v. McFadden, 88 F.2d 639, 644 (2d Cir. 1937). As to recovery of interest, see Demms
v. Blanchard, 270 N.Y.S. 700, 702-03 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1934).
131. Sager v. Friedman, 1 N.E.2d 971, 973 (N.Y. 1936); accordWeber v. Wittmer
Co., 12 F. Supp. 884, 885 (W.D.N.Y. 1935); Equitable Life Assur. Soc. [sic: abbreviated
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in original] v. Kushman, 296 N.Y.S. 143, 145 (1st Dep't 1937); Inman v. Credit Discount
Corp., 245 N.Y.S. 273, 276 (1st Dep't 1930); Commercial Credit Corp. v. Third & La
Fayette Sts. Garage, Inc., 234 N.Y.S. 463, 465 (4th Dep't 1929); Bennett v. Burch-Buell
Motor Corp., 224 N.Y.S. 666 (4th Dep't 1927); Wood v. Hill, 212 N.Y.S. 550, 555 (1st
Dep't 1925); Bettinger v. Montgomery, 210 N.Y.S. 320, 330-31 (Sup. Ct. Erie County
1925); Stumpfv. Wells, 197 N.Y.S. 389, 390-91 (Sup. Ct. Monroe County 1922); Riegel
v. Franzel, 191 N.Y.S. 126, 127 (Sup. Ct. Seneca County 1921). A plaintiff who sought
damages could recover "the actual pecuniary loss sustained as a direct result of the
wrong," which "[o]rdinarily" was "the difference between the amount paid and the value
of the article received," Hotaling v. A.B. Leach & Co., 159 N.E. 870, 871 (N.Y. 1928);
accord, Seaboard Terminal & Refrigeration Co. v. Droste, 80 F.2d 95, 96 (2d Cir. 1935);
Stelwagon Mfg. Co. v. Elvidge, 30 F.2d 285, 287 (2d Cir. 1929); Cowart v. Lang, 298
N.Y.S. 875, 875 (4th Dep't 1937); Majestic Export Co. v. Katz & Greenfield, Inc., 288
N.Y.S. 941, 941 (lst Dep't 1936); Deutsch v. Roy, 268 N.Y.S. 606, 615 (lst Dep't 1934);
Commercial Credit Corp. v. Wells, 240 N.Y.S. 139, 144 (4th Dep't 1930); Nelvan
Constr. Corp. v. Sanka Realty Corp., 236 N.Y.S. 87, 88 (1st Dep't 1929); Graetz v.
Smith, 211 N.Y.S. 577, 578 (2d Dep't 1924); Clinckett v. Casseres, 200 N.Y.S. 178, 181
(2d Dep't 1923); Askin v. Lewin, 251 N.Y.S. 405, 407 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1931);
Reinhardt v. Horace L. Day Co., 213 N.Y.S. 130, 131 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1925), as of
the time of the time of the transaction rather than what the article would have been worth
in the future if the representations had been true, see Abel v. Paterno, 281 N.Y.S. 58, 65
(1st Dep't 1935); Gainsburg v. Bachrack, 270 N.Y.S. 727, 733-34 (1st Dep't 1934). But
see Singleton v. Harriman, 272 N.Y.S. 905, 906 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1933) (allowing
recovery of difference between sum paid and value at time fraud discovered). Lost "profits which ...could [have] been made on contract with third parties" were not recoverable. Foster v. DiPaolo, 140 N.E. 220, 220 (N.Y. 1923); accord Sager v. Friedman, 1
N.E.2d 971, 974 (N.Y. 1936); De Vaughn v. Frank E. McGray Co., 226 N.Y.S. 474,476
(4th Dep't 1928); McClester v. F-I-F Plan Corp., 12 N.Y.S.2d 307, 311 (N.Y. City Mun.
Ct. 1939). But damages could "not be fixed by arbitrary rule," and sometimes other kinds
of damages, such as consequential damages like those for personal injury, flowed from a
fraud. Hotaling, 159 N.E. at 873; see also Beach v. Bongartz, 191 N.Y.S. 336, 337 (1st
Dep't 1921) (a damage remedy was tailored to the specific facts of the case); Tulloch v.
Haselo, 218 N.Y.S. 139, 141 (3d Dep't 1926) (dicta indicating that damages for personal
injury were recoverable). Similarly, a party who was fraudulently induced to retain stock
was permitted to recover the difference in value between the original purchase price and
the price on the date of the discovery of the fraud, see Kaufmann v. Delafield, 229 N.Y.S.
545, 546 (1st Dep't 1928), while a party who retained stock for which "there was no
market" and hence no market value was permitted to recover damages assessed by a jury
on the basis of "the history of the... Company, its properties, development, and results,
[and] the changes in its financial position and prospects, as the same from time to time
developed, until it finally fell into the hands of a receiver," Crandall v. A.B. Leach & Co.,
223 N.Y.S. 127, 130-31 (4th Dep't 1927); accord Page v. Clark, 195 N.Y.S. 529, 530
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both," and it was "thoroughly established that an assertion of a rescission
[was] nullified by the subsequent acceptance of benefits growing out of a

his contract and then
contract." Nor was it possible "by words [to] cancel
132
continue to assert rights and benefits under it."
E. Privacy

A fifth cause of action that was typically of a commercial nature was
for invasion of privacy. Under the law of New York, no right of privacy
existed except to the limited extent provided by Sections 50 and 51 of the
(Sup. Ct. Cayuga County 1922). In the case of a woman who sued her husband for fraud
on account of his misrepresentations as to his health, the Court of Appeals ruled that "pecuniary loss [was] by no means the limit of damage" and that the plaintiff could recover
for "humiliation, disgrace, and mental anguish," as well as for being "deprived of the
society, comfort, and attention of a well man," with the total award resting "largely in the
discretion of the jury." Leventhal v. Liberman, 186 N.E. 675, 677 (N.Y. 1933). But see
Rosenfeld v. Rosenfeld, 2 N.Y.S.2d 107, 110 (N.Y. City Mun. Ct. 1937), which permitted a separated wife to recover from her deceased husband's son arrearages of alimony
only in the amount of the difference between what had been paid and what had been
owed.
Civil arrest was permitted in an action for damages, but not in a suit for rescission.
See Walker v. Sanford, 214 N.Y.S. 202, 203 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1926). A party could
also plead fraud by way of defense or through a counterclaim for damages. See Galloway
v. Wolfe, 249 N.Y.S. 608, 610 (1st Dep't 1931). A person seeking damages or asserting
fraud as a defense was not required to allege an offer to restore what had been received,
as did a person seeking rescission. See Roulston v. Warner, 234 N.Y.S. 643, 644 (Sup.
Ct. N.Y. County 1929).
132. Brennan v. National Equitable Inv. Co., 160 N.E. 924, 924-25 (N.Y. 1928);
accordMerry Realty Co. v. Shamokin & Hollis Real Estate Co., 130 N.E. 306, 309 (N.Y.
1921); General Valuations Co. v. City of Niagara Falls, 1 N.Y.S.2d 880, 883 (4th Dep't
1938); Thompson v. Thompson, 250 N.Y.S. 433, 438 (1st Dep't 1931); Trowbridge v.
Oehmsen, 202 N.Y.S. 833, 839 (2d Dep't 1924). It was possible, however, to join an
action for damages to an action to recover the price, see Handman Silk Corp. v. Wilon,
278 N.Y.S. 507 (2d Dep't 1935), since both were consistent with an affirmation of the
contract. Once made, an election of remedies was normally "final," Clark v. Kirby, 153
N.E. 79, 81 (N.Y. 1926), and waived any remedies which were not elected. See Silvestri
v. Associated Gas & Elec. Corp., 268 N.Y.S. 763, 765 (4th Dep't 1934); accord Armstrong v. Herman, 241 N.Y.S. 282, 288 (1st Dep't 1930); J.C. Turner Lumber Co. v. Lacey, 191 N.Y.S. 774, 776-77 (lst Dep't 1922).
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New York Civil Rights Law,'33 which did not protect personal privacy,
but merely prohibited commercial exploitation of an individual's name
or likeness.

Section 50 was a criminal provision that made a person who, without
consent, used "the name, portrait or picture of any living person" for
"trade" or "advertising purposes" guilty of a misdemeanor, 134 while Section 51 gave civil remedies in the form of injunctive relief and an action
for damages to the person injured. 35 The two sections were "remedial
statute[s] ... designed to stop the merchandising ... of a portrait of a
person who occupies a position in which there is a monetary value by
publicizing the [sic] same."' 136 As such, they were to be given "a liberal
rather than a pinched construction"--"not [as] an alien intruder in the
house of the common law, but [as] a guest to be welcomed and made at
home there, as a new and powerful aid in the accomplishment of its appointed task of accommodating the law to social needs.' 37 However,
133. See Kimmerle v. New York Evening Journal, Inc., 186 N.E. 217, 217-18
(N.Y. 1933); Bunnell v. Keystone Varnish Co., 5 N.Y.S.2d 415, 415 (2d Dep't 1938);
Martin v. New Metro. Fiction, Inc., 248 N.Y.S. 359, 361 (Sup. Ct. Rensselaer County
1931).
134. N.Y. Civ.RIGHTSLAw § 50 (McKinney 1992).
135. See id. § 51.
136. Kline v. Robert M. McBride & Co., 11 N.Y.S.2d 674, 682 (Sup. Ct. N.Y.
County 1939).
137. Jackson v. Consumer Publications, Inc., 10 N.Y.S.2d 691, 693 (Sup. Ct. N.Y.
County 1939). The courts often did apply Sections 50 and 51 liberally in pursuit of their
remedial goals. Thus, they upheld suits by an individual for unauthorized use of his picture in a cartoon, see McNulty v. Press Pub. Co., 241 N.Y.S. 29, 32 (Sup. Ct. N.Y.
County 1930), by an actress for unauthorized use of her picture in a locket sold in the
defendant's store, see Lane v. F.W. Woolworth Co., 11 N.Y.S.2d 199, 201 (Sup. Ct. N.Y.
County 1939), by a painter for unauthorized use of his name to advertise an embroidery
of his painting, see Neyland v. Home Pattern Co., 65 F.2d 363, 363, 365 (2d Cir. 1933),
by a socialite for unauthorized use of photographs taken at a social event in her home, see
Holmes v. Underwood & Underwood, Inc., 233 N.Y.S. 153, 153 (1st Dep't 1929), and by
a boxer for use of his name over 100 times in an allegedly fictional account about boxing,
see Krieger v. Popular Publications, Inc., 3 N.Y.S.2d 480, 482 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County
1938). In two cases suits were upheld upon publication of pictures of seminude women.
See Myers v. Afro-American Pub. Co., 5 N.Y.S.2d 223, 223-24 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County
1938); Semler v. Ultem Publications, Inc., 9 N.Y.S.2d 319, 320 (City Ct. N.Y. County
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efforts to extend the reach of the statute beyond the merchandising of an
individual's personality failed early on. Thus, an actor who complained
that a movie he made was edited and reconstructed in ways other than
that originally contemplated received no relief.138 Likewise, the statute
was read narrowly in a case that held that a course of conduct leading a
defendant to believe it had permission to use a person's name could be
pleaded in mitigation
of damages even though it would not constitute a
39
complete defense.1
H.

BusINESS EFFICIENCY, FREEDOM OF OPPORTUNITY, AND
UPWARD MOBILITY

Protection of established wealth through doctrines of trespass, conversion, fraud, privacy, and tortious interference with contract, however,
came at a price. The law regulating business conduct, as it stood at the
outset of the 1920s, often interfered with business efficiency, freedom of
opportunity, and ultimately upward social mobility. According to Judge
40
Harold J. Hinman's dissent in the 1922 case of Beardsley v. Kilmer,1
America was supposed to be:
a land of opportunity, as well as of free competition in business,
and it becomes pro tanto a land of oppression, where we lay
down the fixed principle that a man who is wealthy enough and
malicious enough can shut the door of opportunity to the object
of his hatred by rivaling him in business, with no other aim in
view than his destruction, and be held to be in the exercise of his
legal rights in so doing. Such an act of unmixed malice ought to

1938). In another case, the court held that a plaintiff's gratuitous license to use her name
and portrait to advertise the defendant's perfume was revocable at will. See Garden v.
Parfumerie Rigaud, Inc., 271 N.Y.S. 187, 189 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1933).
138. See Fairbanks v. Winik, 198 N.Y.S. 299, 299-300 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County

1922).
139. See Hammoadv. Crowell Pub. Co., 1 N.Y.S.2d 728, 729 (1st Dep't 1938).
140. 193 N.Y.S. 285, 290 (3d Dep't 1922) (dissenting opinion).
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14 1
be... contrary to the prevailing public morality.

Judge Hinman expressed his belief that the law would change, and in
a matter of years, change did begin to occur.
The engine that drove the change was the ascension to the bench of
individuals from the Catholic and Jewish immigrant groups against
whom traditional anti-redistribution doctrines had been primarily aimed.
Consider, for example, the New York Court of Appeals, with its complement of seven judges. At the beginning of 1920, all the judges on the
court elected to full fourteen-year terms, with the single exception of
Benjamin N. Cardozo, were Protestants. A second Jew, Irving Lehman,
joined the court for a full term at the beginning of 1924, and then a
Catholic, John F. O'Brien, joined the court permanently in 1927. As a
result, by the end of the decade, three of the seven judges on the New
York Court of Appeals were either Catholic or Jewish. 142 Thereafter, at
least three, and sometimes a majority, of the judges of the seven-member
court were either Catholics or Jews. As members of these religious minorities came to wield substantial power within the judiciary, legal doctrine in borderline cases slowly changed, and courts became more sensitive to the need for business efficiency, freedom of opportunity, and ultimately upward mobility for the children of immigrants.
Privacy was one of the first areas of law in which courts began to focus less on protecting established wealth and more on the competing
value of business efficiency. In order not to impede legitimate business
activities, the New York Civil Rights Law was interpreted narrowly. As
early as the late 1920s, the lower courts ruled that the law did not prohibit publication in a work of nonfiction of "matters dealing incidentally

141. Id. at 290 (dissenting opinion).
142. See generally the page at the outset of each volume of the Naw YoRK
REPORTS (which lists the judges of the Court of Appeals), and WHO WAS WHO IN
AMERICA, vols. 1-2 (1943-1968) (which gives judges' general backgrounds). For Judge
Crane's religious affiliation, see F.E. Crane, 78, Dies: Led State Jurists, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 22, 1947, at 15.
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with specific persons and concerning things of current interest, 143 even
"in connection with advertising or trade." 144 "[E]very unauthorized use of
a name or picture in connection with trade or advertising [did] not imply
a violation of the statute," which was not "intend[ed] to stop the dissemination of 'news' as a business in itself or as adjunct to the sale of advertising."'145 "Were it otherwise, many lines of business would have to be
abandoned." 146 Thus, the unauthorized publication of a photograph of a
Hindu mystic to illustrate a news article or of a semi-educational or "feature" article was not actionable. 47 Additionally, an actress who had assumed the stage name of Aunt Jemima was not allowed to sue Log Cabin
Products for its use of the Aunt Jemima trademark under a licensing
agreement with the trademark's owner, Quaker Oats Company. 148 The
courts also read the statute narrowly when they refused to allow suit by
an obese woman photographed in a newsreel while exercising in a
gym,149 and by an attorney, Frank M. Swacker, whose surname was used
in a work of fiction. 150
Concerns for business efficiency and freedom of opportunity became
manifest in the New York Court of Appeals by the early 1930s. Considerations designed to protect the smooth operation of business, for example, limited the judiciary's willingness to hold innocent entities strictly
liable in conversion. Thus, in the 1932 case of Clarke v. Public National
Bank & Trust Co., 151 the New York Court of Appeals declined to hold a

143.

Kline v. Robert M. McBride & Co., 11 N.Y.S.2d 674, 679 (Sup. Ct. N.Y.

County 1939).
144. Damron v. Doubleday, Doran & Co., 231 N.Y.S. 444, 446 (Sup. Ct. N.Y.
County 1928).
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. See Lahiri v. Daily Mirror, Inc., 295 N.Y.S. 382, 390 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County

1937).
148. See Gardella v. Log Cabin Prods. Co., 89 F.2d 891, 894 (2d Cir. 1937).
149. See Sweenek v. Pathe News, Inc., 16 F. Supp. 746, 748 (E.D.N.Y. 1936).
150. See Swacker v. Wright, 277 N.Y.S. 296, 298 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1935);
accordDavis v. R.K.O. Radio Pictures, Inc., 16 F. Supp. 195, 196 (S.D.N.Y. 1936).
151. 181 N.E. 574, 575 (N.Y. 1932).
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bank liable for a fiduciary's conversion of funds simply because it permitted the fiduciary to deposit in an individual account checks drawn to
him in his fiduciary capacity. The Court reasoned that, in the absence of
clear notice to the contrary, the bank had the right to presume that the
fiduciary would not misuse the funds, with Judge Lehman observing that
"[t]he transactions of banking in a great financial center are not to be
clogged, and their pace slackened, by overburdensome restrictions. 152
The 1922 Beardsley dissent of Judge Hinman, declaring that the
wealthy and malicious should not be able to shut the door of opportunity
to the poor, was also vindicated by the New York Court of Appeals in
1932, in the case of Al Raschid v. News Syndicate Co.15 3 The plaintiff in
Al Raschid alleged that the defendant maliciously gave false information
to immigration officials, which caused them to bring deportation proceedings against him on seven occasions. (The defendant's rights as a
native-born citizen were ultimately vindicated.) Prior to Al Raschid, the
lower courts had struggled with the impact of motive in rendering conduct lawful or unlawful. It was always clear that "one who act[ed] honestly" and without negligence was "free from liability"; 15 4 the debatable
issue was whether bad motive transformed otherwise innocent acts into
tortious ones. On this question, lower courts initially held that lawful acts
committed out of malice were not actionable. 155 These holdings had been

152. Id. (quoting Whiting v. Hudson Trust Co., 138 N.E. 33, 37 (N.Y. 1923).
Nonetheless, a bank remained a proper party defendant against which proof of notice
could properly be introduced. See Land Mark Corp. v. Manufacturers' Trust Co., 262
N.Y.S. 709, 711 (2d Dep't 1933). Of course, ancient rules of negotiable instruments law
had protected banks in many sorts of transactions. For example, a bank could "not commit a wrong in the acceptance of the check unless it had notice, either actual or sufficient
to put it upon inquiry," that the check was wrongfully issued. Mutual Trust Co. v. Merchants' Nat'l Bank, 141 N.E. 922, 923 (N.Y. 1923); cf Hoyt v. Wright, 261 N.Y.S. 131,
133 (1st Dep't 1932) (customer's receipt of excess payment on closure of brokerage account held not to constitute conversion).
153. 191 N.E. 713, 714 (N.Y. 1934).
154. In re Spencer Kellogg & Sons, Inc., 52 F.2d 129, 135 (2d Cir. 1931).
155. See Carroll Bldg. Corp. v. Louis Greenberg Plumbing Supplies, Inc., 214
N.Y.S. 42, 44 (2d Dep't 1926); Almirall & Co. v. McClement, 202 N.Y.S. 139, 147 (1st
Dep't 1923); Brown v. Metropolitan News Co., 267 N.Y.S. 623, 626 (Sup. Ct. Bronx
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followed by the appellate division in Al Raschid,156 which had dismissed
the plaintiff's complaint. The New York Court of Appeals, in contrast,
reversed and ruled unanimously that "a lawful act done solely out of malice and ill will to injure another may be actionable"1 57and directed that
plaintiff be permitted to plead the specifics of his case.
Most importantly, perhaps, the court cited with approval a Minnesota
case imposing liability on a defendant who had "set up a barber shop for
the sole purpose of injuring the plaintiffs business and driving him out
of it-the wrongdoer being wealthy and not interested in the business
itself-and diverting customers from the plaintiff solely for the accomplishment of his malevolent purpose.' 58 This Minnesota case was directly contrary to the Beardsley case, which had allowed a wealthy individual to drive a less affluent antagonist out of business and had produced Judge's Hinman's dissenting plea for greater freedom of opportunity for the downtrodden.
Nonetheless, the Al Raschid case represented a mixed development.
On the one hand, the case restrained the malevolence of wealthy individuals bent on the destruction of their inferiors. On the other hand, Al
Raschid created the possibility of judicial interference in business rivalries where losers claimed that winners had acted for malicious rather
than legitimate business reasons. Judges then had to pass upon the
claims. On the assumption that, during the decade of the 1920s, it was
the rich who were seeking to restrain competition from upwardly mobile
underlings, Al Raschid was a pro-competitive decision. However, it also
had the capacity to become anti-competitive if business entities used it to
obtain frequent judicial inquiries into their rivals' activities.
In any event, Al Raschid applied only to cases where a defendant had
a culpable state of mind. Absent culpability, "[t]he principles of free

County 1933); In re Curtiss' Will, 250 N.Y.S. 146, 150 (Sur. Ct. Steuben County 1931);
see also Morgan v. Morgan, 221 N.Y.S. 117, 118 (1st Dep't 1927) (no cause of action
against witness maliciously giving false testimony).
156. 267 N.Y.S. 221,225 (1st Dep't 1933).
157. Gillis v. Georgas, 225 N.Y.S.2d 164, 166 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1962).
158. Raschidv. News Syndicate Co., 191 N.E. 713, 714 (N.Y. 1934).
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competition justifjied] a man in getting business for himself."159 Thus, it
was "the prerogative of any business man, with or without reason, to
continue or discontinue in business, to change, alter or modify the nature
of his business as he sees fit," even though "willing workers" would be
"rendered idle and unhappy" and the closure "was done deliberately to
avoid a labor dispute., 160 There was enough self-interest in such a closure to preclude a finding of malice, and in the absence of malice, "the
"alone involved," and "the law
question of the legality" of the act was
16
[was] indifferent to the result thereof." '
Likewise, a labor union would not be said to have acted maliciously
and would be left free to interfere with and impose hardship upon businessmen, consumers, and nonunion employees as long as "the purpose of
such interference [was] solely to advance the interest of the members of
the union." 162 To hold a defendant liable absent some sort of culpability
"would be a harsh result, and contrary to the general doctrine of torts,"'163
which, at its root, remained tied to a property-protective paradigm that
required an individual to disgorge wealth to a victim of injury only if
moral fault could be pinned on the individual.
A. Fraud
Throughout the twentieth century, the law of New York relating to
159.

Du-Art Film Labs, Inc. v. Consolidated Film Indus., Inc., 15 F. Supp. 689,

690 (S.D.N.Y. 1936).
160. Mittman & Co. v. Sirota, 111 N.Y.S.2d 100, 102 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County
1952).
161. Paul v. Mencher, 7 N.Y.S.2d 821,822 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1937).
162. O'Keefe v. Local 463 of United Ass'n of Plumbers and Gasfitters, 14 N.E.2d
77, 80 (N.Y. 1938); see also Bucko v. Murray, 11 N.Y.S.2d 402, 404 (Sup. Ct. N.Y.
County 1939) (trial court held labor unions incapable as a matter of law of acting "in bad
faith or through malice or ill will nor may they be actuated by malice or a desire to injure
employees, whether the latter be members of the union or not").
163. Barry v. Hughes, 103 F.2d 427, 427 (2d Cir. 1939). But see Federal Sugar
Refining Co. v. United States Sugar Equalization Bd, Inc., 268 F. 575, 585 (S.D.N.Y.
1920) (defendant was held liable in tort for wrongful conduct ordered by an executive
officer of the federal government).

NEW YORKLA WSCHOOL LA WREVIEW

[Vol. 43

business conduct has retained its concern with protection of property,

and, as a result, it has manifested substantial stability. In connection with
the law of fraud, for example, concern that wealth transfers could be legitimate only when made with full disclosure and free consent provided
little motivation for expanding fraud doctrine in the second half of the
century. Doctrine therefore remained quite stable through the 1970s, as
innumerable cases recited or focused on one or more of "the classic ele-

ments of false representation, scienter, materiality, expectation of reliance and damage that go to make up [the] fraud."'
were also reiterated.' 65

64

Other classic rules

164. Bankers Trust Co. v. J.V. Dowler & Co., 390 N.E.2d 766, 771 (N.Y.1979);
accord, e.g., Hong Kong Export Credit Insur. Corp. v. Dun & Bradstreet, 414 F. Supp.
153, 158-59 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Jo Ann Homes at Bellmore, Inc. v. Dworetz, 250 N.E.2d
214, 217 (N.Y.1969); Channel Master Corp. v. Aluminium Ltd. Sales, Inc., 151 N.E.2d
833, 835 (N.Y. 1958); Automatic Truck Loader Corp. v. City of New York, 57 N.Y.S.2d
295, 299 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1945); Hoffman v. Ryan, 422 N.Y.S.2d 288, 290 (Civil
Ct. N.Y. County 1979); Mionie v. 341 Grand Street Corp., 74 N.Y.S.2d 69,70 (Civil Ct.
N.Y. County 1947).
165. Thus, the courts continued to hold that while no fraud action would lie for
falsely obtaining a judgment, suit could be brought for obtaining a judgment as part of a
larger fraudulent scheme. See Newin Corp. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 333
N.E.2d 163, 166 (N.Y. 1975); Photo-Marker Corp. v. Penn-Keystone Realty Corp., 243
N.Y.S.2d 461, 462 (1st Dep't 1963); Burbrooke Mfg. Co. v. St. George Textile Corp.,
129 N.Y.S.2d 588, 589 (ist Dep't 1954). Another old rule was that "[m]ere promissory
statements as to what will be done in the future [were] not actionable," unless the "promise was actually made with a preconceived and undisclosed intention of not performing
it." Sabo v. Delman, 143 N.E.2d 906, 907-08 (N.Y.1957); accordGovernment of India v.
Cargill, Inc., 445 F. Supp. 714, 719 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Plum Tree, Inc. v. N.K. Winston
Corp., 351 F. Supp. 80, 85 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); Keers & Co. v. American Steel & Pump
Corp., 234 F. Supp. 201, 203 (S.D.N.Y. 1964); Lanzi v. Brooks, 373 N.E.2d 278, 279
(N.Y. 1977); Rudman v. Cowles Communications, Inc., 30 N.Y.2d 1, 9 (N.Y. 1972);
Steinberg v. Universal Machinenfabrik GMBH, 264 N.Y.S.2d 757, 760 (2d Dep't 1965);
Seidman v. Bandes, 74 N.Y.S.2d 883, 886 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1947). Thus, a person who passed a check with insufficient funds was guilty of fraud. See A. Sam & Sons
Produce Co. v. Campese, 217 N.Y.S.2d 275, 275 (4th Dep't 1961); Cudahy Packing Co.
v. Dorfman, 120 N.Y.S.2d 460, 460 (1st Dep't 1952); Lippman Packing Co. v. Rose, 120
N.Y.S.2d 461, 465 (N.Y. City Mun. Ct. 1953). Similarly, pure opinions were not actionable, but opinions became a basis for fraud if they were part of a mixed statement of fact
and opinion if they were represented as sincere when, in reality, they were not. See
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In addition, the judiciary refused, in a number of areas, to extend the
reach of the doctrine. One such area involved fraud claims between
spouses, and fraud claims in other familial matters. 66 By the late 1960s

George Backer Management Corp. v. Acme Quilting Co., 385 N.E.2d 1062, 1066-67
(N.Y. 1978); National Conversion Corp. v. Cedar Bldg. Corp., 246 N.E.2d 351, 354-55
(N.Y. 1969); Gross v. State Cooperage Export Crating & Shipping Co., 299 N.Y.S.2d
773, 774 (2d Dep't 1969). "Declarations made with reckless indifference for the truth
[were] viewed in the same light" as fraudulent. United States v. Amrep Corp., 560 F.2d
539, 543 (2d Cir. 1977); accord Rolf v. Blyth, Eastman Dillon & Co., 570 F.2d 38, 46
(2d Cir. 1978); In re Investors Funding Corp. of New York Securities Litigation, 523 F.
Supp. 533, 545 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); Chiodo v. Garramone, 175 N.Y.S.2d 490, 492 (Sup. Ct.
Onondaga County. 1958); Duro Sportswear, Inc. v. Cogen, 131 N.Y.S.2d 20, 25 (Sup. Ct.
N.Y. County 1954); People v. Block & Kleaver, Inc., 427 N.Y.S.2d 133, 140 (Monroe
County Ct. 1980); Levin v. Zeeman, 94 N.Y.S.2d 441, 444 (City Ct. N.Y. County 1949).
But see Hill v. Sharples Corp., 247 F.2d 405, 409 (2d Cir. 1957) (no fraud liability if
defendant's belief in truth of statements was not "clearly unreasonable"). Three other
classic rules were that a plaintiff had to plead fraud with particularity, see Lynn v. Valentine, 19 F.R.D. 250, 254 (S.D.N.Y. 1956); C.I.T. Financial Corp. v. Sachs, 10 F.R.D. 397,
398 (S.D.N.Y. 1950), that fraud had to be proved by clear and convincing evidence, see
Ajax Hardware Mfg. Corp. v. Industrial Plants Corp., 569 F.2d 181, 186 (2d Cir. 1977);
Woods v. Barnes, 84 F. Supp. 155, 158 (N.D.N.Y. 1949); Pierce v. Richard Ellis & Co.,
310 N.Y.S.2d 266, 269 (Civ. Ct. N.Y. County 1970), and that, if successful, a plaintiff
was entitled alternatively to rescission or damages. See Fitzgerald v. Title Guarantee &
Trust Co., 49 N.E.2d 489, 491-92 (N.Y. 1943); Goldsmith v. National Container Corp.,
40 N.E.2d 242, 244 (N.Y. 1942); Clearview Assocs., Inc. v. Clearview Gardens First
Corp., 168 N.Y.S.2d 432, 441 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1957).
166. It was established law during the 1940's that a spouse who had been induced
by false representations to enter into marriage could maintain an action for fraud. See
Benintendi v. Benintendi, 72 N.Y.S.2d 843, 844 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1947); Amsterdam v. Amsterdam, 56 N.Y.S.2d 19, 22 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1945); Cohen v. Kahn, 28
N.Y.S.2d 847, 848 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1941). Such a spouse could also obtain an
annulment of the marriage. See Saunders v. Saunders, 63 N.Y.S.2d 880, 881 (Sup. Ct.
Westchester County 1946). There were also cases allowing the maintenance of actions
for fraud in procuring separation agreements. See Schroeder v. Schroeder, 56 N.Y.S.2d
36, 37-38 (4th Dep't 1945); Weintraub v. Weintraub, 91 N.Y.S.2d 452 (Sup. Ct. N.Y.
County 1949). During the 1950 and 1960, in contrast, the cases of fraudulent inducement
to marry were divided. Compare Gonzalez v. Gonzalez, 228 N.Y.S.2d 4, 6 (Sup. Ct.
Queens County. 1962) and Friedman v. Libin, 157 N.Y.S.2d 474, 485 (Sup. Ct. Bronx
County 1956) and Levine v. Levine, 146 N.Y.S.2d 393, 394 (N.Y. City Mun. Ct. 1956)
(suits allowed), with Rappel v. Rappel, 240 N.Y.S.2d 692, 698-99 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County
1963) and Simms v. Simms, 221 N.Y.S.2d 1020, 1022 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1961)
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and 1970s, courts also were rejecting claims that a decedent's paramour
had fraudulently induced an insurance company to pay the proceeds of
his life insurance policy to her rather than to the plaintiff wife,' 67 that a
separation agreement had been procured by a wife's threat to reveal her
husband's homosexuality, 168 and that a wife had broken her fraudulent
promise publicly to acknowledge her marriage to the plaintiff.16 9 Finally,

the courts remained hesitant to allow
fraud suits for the purpose of upset170
ting family property settlements.

(suits not allowed). Although the Court of Appeals allowed suit to be brought in an egre-

gious case in which a man had put a woman through a sham marriage ceremony, see
Tuck v. Tuck, 200 N.E.2d 554, 556 (N.Y. 1964), an Appellate Division case that refused
to permit suit unless the parties "were engaged or otherwise in a relationship of trust and
confidence" when the misrepresentations were made, Pluchino v. Pluchino, 148 N.Y.S.2d
508, 510 (2d Dep't 1956), was more predictive of the law's direction. The Court of Appeals also put an effective end to suits claiming fraud in the inducement of separation
agreements with a 1951 declaration that, when "a dispute over the amount to be paid by a
husband for the support of his wife reaches the stage of court action, resort must be had to
the appropriate statutory action" rather than to a common-law suit for fraud. Weintraub v.
Weintraub, 96 N.E.2d 724, 727 (N.Y. 1951) (wife's disclaimer in separation agreement
barred her suit against her husband). See also Cohen v. Cohen, 151 N.Y.S.2d 949, 951
(1st Dep't 1956); cf Holm v. Shilensky, 388 F.2d 54, 57 (2d Cir. 1968) (to allow fraud
suit would deny full faith and credit to Nevada divorce decree). Fraud suits in regard to
support matters were successfully maintained, however, in special circumstances-by a
wife alleging a scheme by her husband to withhold support payments despite his ability
to make them, see Wolf v. Wolf, 263 N.Y.S.2d 195, 197-99 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County.
1965), by a husband seeking to recover payments made to a wife after she had failed to
inform him of her remarriage, see W _
v. B.__....__, 183 N.Y.S.2d 258, 261 (2d
Dep't 1958), and by a widow seeking to set aside an agreement waiving her intestate
share of her deceased husband's estate see In re Denny's Estate, 160 N.Y.S.2d 722, 727
(Sur. Ct. Dutchess County 1957).
167. See Cummings v. Kaminski, 290 N.Y.S.2d 408, 411 (Sup. Ct. Kings County
1968).
168. See Smith v. Jones, 351 N.Y.S.2d 802, 807 (Civ. Ct. N.Y. County 1973).
169. See Roney v. Janis, 430 N.Y.S.2d 333, 335 (1st Dep't 1980); see also Puffer
v. City of Binghamton, 301 N.Y.S.2d 274, 281 (Sup. Ct. Broome County 1969) (claim
that a city clerk committed fraud in issuing a marriage license to a defendant who had
failed to obtain court permission to remarry).
170. See Ross v. Preston, 55 N.E.2d 490,492 (N.Y. 1944) (dismissal of fraud suit
affirmed); Greenfield v. Greenfield, 123 N.Y.S.2d 19, 22 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1953)
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The disappearance of fraud suits in marital and other family contexts
also suggests, however, that traditional moral standards were beginning
to erode and that the law was beginning to place less weight on the ethical values of honesty and full disclosure in personal affairs. Other cases
confirm this suggestion. In one case a defendant claimed, allegedly contrary to the facts, to be "an honorable person ... able to facilitate negotiations with" a particular foreign government, but the court refused to
impose fraud liability, declaring that "[b]are assertions of personal honor
and of ability ... [could not] constitute actionable fraud.', 17 1 For this
judge in New York City in 1946, the increasingly important social value
of individual autonomy perhaps outweighed the older moral values that
had underlain the classical law of fraud.
For a Manhattan judge three decades later, that would clearly be the
situation in a case where Bloomingdale's, the renowned department
store, claimed that a debtor, who was a former lawyer, was fraudulently
seeking to avoid payment of a $52,381 judgment.' 72 Bloomingdale's
sought to compel the debtor's wife to testify to his whereabouts and to
the support payments she was receiving. The court ruled, however, that
the marital privilege shielded her from the questions. In the court's view,
"[flrustration in fact-finding by reason of a statutory privilege based
upon public policy considerations" of privacy and autonomy was "not
fraud" or "concealment of fraud."'173 Preserving marital privacy outweighed the potentially competing value of preventing the possibly
fraudulent redistribution of wealth that would occur when Bloomingdale's wrote off an uncollectible debt.
Traditional values of honesty and full disclosure were also slighted
in cases where courts refused to subject entrepreneurs to common law
(granting motion to require amended complaint). But see Tammero v. Tammero, 125
N.Y.S.2d 355, 357 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1953) (holding that a misrepresentation of law
may be the basis of an action for fraud where a relation of trust and confidence exists
between the parties).
171. Cohen v. Cabo, 61 N.Y.S.2d 145, 146 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1946).
172. See Federated Dep't Stores, Inc. v. Esser, 409 N.Y.S.2d 353, 357 (Sup. Ct.
N.Y. County 1978).
173. Id. at 357.
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fraud liability if they directed their deception to "the public at large"
rather than to an individual plaintiff.174 In one such case presenting "a
novel situation which highlights the complex commercial relationships of
modem times," a court refused to enjoin the producers of a popular radio
show, which allegedly played each week's top ten songs without ever
informing the public that no survey was done to determine rankings,
"from intentionally making false statements which are injurious to another's business," since the plaintiff and the defendant producers were
neither in privity of contract nor "in competition. '7 5 Some years later
another judge indicated that sellers of goods who advertised despite their
inability to deliver their product in the reasonably foreseeable future
were not guilty of common law fraud, although they were subject to
statutory remedies administered by the state attorney general.1 76 Entering
into a contract without disclosing a known condition of insolvency was
also held not to constitute fraud. 177 In a similar vein, federal judges came
to view the anti-fraud provisions of the federal securities laws not as
spurs to business honesty and morality but as mechanisms for "providing
with all the facts needed to make intelligent investment deciinvestors
178
sions.'
The values of honesty, full disclosure, and not allowing property to
be taken without the informed consent of its owner-the values on which
classic fraud doctrine had rested-were thereby trumped by concerns for
business efficiency as well as privacy and autonomy. The traditional values were also trumped in another line of cases by a third modem valuea concern for the proper and efficient functioning of the legal system it-

174. See Advance Music Corp. v. American Tobacco Co., 50 N.Y.S.2d 287, 291
(Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1944). On a subsequent appeal in the same case, Advance Music
Corp. v. American Tobacco Co., 70 N.E. 401, 402 (N.Y. 1946), the Court of Appeals
upheld an amended complaint by plaintiff on a theory other than fraud.
175. Id.
176. See State by Lefkowitz v. Bevis Indus., Inc., 314 N.Y.S.2d 60, 64 (Sup. Ct.
N.Y. County 1970).
177. See Archawski v. Hanioti, 239 F.2d 806, 812 (2d Cir. 1956).
178. Herzfeld v. Laventhol, Krekstein, Horwath & Horwath, 378 F.2d 112, 122
(2d Cir. 1974).
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self.

This modem concern for judicial efficiency was initially felt in cases
arising out of World War II rent and price control. Federal legislation
enacted during the war and continued by the state thereafter had given
both commercial and residential tenants a right, subject to certain specific exceptions, to remain in leased premises with little or no rent increase following the expiration of their term. 179 Many landlords responded by knowingly presenting false information to regulatory authori-

ties to fit within one of the exceptions and thereby obtain eviction orders,
or, alternatively, by threatening tenants with doing so. Could these tenants induced by such falsity to surrender their right to remain, bring a
fraud suit after vacating the premises? Observing that "[tihe legality of
diverse [price control] orders, etc., and their precise application ...
[were] not free from doubt and [were] open to debate,"' 80 some lower
court judges allowed such suits, 18' while others did not.1 2 Ultimately,
though, the New York Court of Appeals held that no judicial remedy in
state courts could exist, 8 3 in part because state courts lacked "jurisdic-

179. See William E. Nelson, Government Power as a Tool for Redistributing
Wealth in Twentieth Century New York, in LAW AS CULTURE AND CULTURE AS LAW:
ESsAYS IN HONOR OF JOHN PHLLIP REID 322, 434-38 (Hendrik Hartog & William E. Nelson eds., 2000).
180. Hamilton Rubber Mfg. Co. v. Greater New York Carpet House, Inc., 47
N.Y.S.2d 210,211 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1944).
181. See Alabiso v. Schuster, 80 N.Y.S.2d 314, 315 (4th Dep't 1948); Rubin v.
Scelsi, 83 N.Y.S.2d 474, 477 (City Ct. Bronx County 1948); Joanette Juniors, Inc. v.
Board of Home Missions, 94 N.Y.S.2d 752, 753 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1949); Rosenbluth v. Sackadorf, 76 N.Y.S.2d 447, 450 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1947); Arm v. Kenridge Knitting Corp., 104 N.Y.S.2d 670, 672 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1951).
182. See Pawgan v. Schneiderman, 85 N.Y.S.2d 615, 616 (2d Dep't 1948); cf
Connell v. Lazar, 94 N.Y.S.2d 235,237 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1949) (evicted tenant has
no cause of action against third party for interference with contractual relations).
183. See Rosner v. Textile Binding & Trimming Co., 90 N.E. 2d 481, 482 (N.Y.
1950); A.B. Magonigle Trucking Co. v. Tambini, 96 N.E.2d 900, 901 (N.Y. 1951); cf
Fieger v. Glen Oaks Village, Inc., 132 N.E. 2d 492, 496 (N.Y. 1956) (tenants may not
obtain review in common-law fraud action of rents set in F.H.A. housing project). Subsequently created statutory remedies were interpreted narrowly. See Denkensohn v. Ridgway Apartments, Inc., 180 N.Y.S.2d 144, 148 (2d Dep't 1958); Huff v. Maurel Realty
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184
tion to review Federal administrative orders."
This concern that state courts in a federal system retain a proper def-

erence to national law and national lawmaking institutions was paralleled
three years later in a case in federal court, where a district judge took the
view that the "least appropriate of judicial forums in staking out new
claims in the substantive law of torts is a federal one where constitutional
considerations require national deference to State ascendancy in this
area."'18 5 This same judge was also concerned with "the threat of inundation of litigation ' 86 if the law of fraud was interpreted in an expansive
fashion.

Corp., 102 N.Y.S.2d 279, 282-83 (N.Y. City Mun. Ct. 1951); cf Niederman v. Straus,
145 N.Y.S.2d 745, 747 (2d Dep't 1955) (allowing tenant to join common-law fraud suit
to statutory remedy when damages under both identical).
184. Wasservogel v. Meyerowitz, 89 N.E.2d 712, 717 (N.Y. 1949). Lower courts
were also divided on whether fraud could be maintained for false statements that property
could be rented or goods sold for a price higher than that set by the regulatory agency,
compare Saklaris v. Evangelista, 155 N.Y.S.2d 256, 258 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1956)
(suit allowed); and Unger v. Eagle Fish Co., 56 N.Y.S.2d 265, 266 (Sup. Ct. Kings
County 1945) (suit allowed), with Sommer v. E.B. Kelly Co., 47 N.Y.S.2d 57, 59-60
(City Ct. Kings County 1944) (suit not allowed), or to recover bribes paid to obtain leases
at regulated rental prices, compare 34 Hillside Realty Corp. v. Norton, 101 N.Y.S.2d 437,
438 (City Ct. Bronx County 1950) (suit allowed), with Ingber v. Weinbrot, 100 N.Y.S.2d
662, 664 (N.Y. City Mn. Ct. 1950) (suit improper). See also Savoy Curtain Corp. v.
Lobell, 73 N.Y.S.2d 108, 108-09 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1947) (landlord allowed to sue
tenant who breached promise to leave at end of term). Arguably the Court of Appeals
spoke affirmatively on these issues and inconsistently with its holding in Wasservogel
when it upheld a classic fraud suit by an employee who had agreed to continue work for a
reduced salary on his employer's false representation that the reduction had been mandated by the Salary Stabilization Board. See Hanlon v. MacFadden Publications, Inc., 99
N.E.2d 546, 549-50 (N.Y. 1951). Fraud suits relating to regulatory matters were also
allowed in other classic cases. See Klein v. Yale Homes, Inc., 158 N.Y.S.2d 881, 884
(Sup. Ct. Bronx County 1956) (prepayment on house recovered after seller's promise that
V.A. would approve its construction and seller's obstruction of efforts to get V.A. approval); New York City Hous. Auth. v. Stem, 159 N.Y.S.2d 500, 505 (N.Y. City Mun.
Ct. 1956) (suit allowed against public housing tenants who lied about their eligibility).
185. Dale System, Inc. v. General Teleration, Inc., 105 F. Supp. 745, 752
(S.D.N.Y. 1952).
186. Id. at751.
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State judges also expressed concern about a possible litigation explosion. Simcuski v. Saeli18 7 was a case in which a doctor had committed
fraud to cover up malpractice; the patient had not discovered the fraud,
and hence the malpractice, until the statute of limitations on a malpractice suit had run. The issue in the case was not whether the patient could
recover for fraud, since she surely could, but whether her damages would
be the usual award given for malpractice or some different award appropriate to fraud. The court opted for the latter and determined her damages
to be not the negligence judgment that she lost through the doctor's
cover-up but the cost of obtaining a cure for the malpractice-the cure
the doctor would have had to provide gratis if no cover-up had occurred.1 83 Unfortunately, since there was no cure, the cost of obtaining it
was zero, and the plaintiffs damages were nominal. "Accordingly," as
the Court recognized, its "decision [was] not to be expected to open the
proverbial floodgates, 189 which could remain securely closed as judicial
efficiency triumphed over medical disclosure and honesty.
The policies of individual freedom, business efficiency, and proper
functioning of the judiciary did not stand as an obstacle, however, to all
extensions of the law of fraud. Some such extensions did occur between
1940 and 1980, but not as a result of adherence to traditional values in
the law of fraud of honesty, full disclosure, and the like. Instead, the
most important motivating force behind pro-plaintiff change was a different moralistic value-a concern for equality, which took the form of
judicial protection of the weak against those in possession of superior
knowledge or of superior legal or market power. 90 Although this concern had long existed, it gained great strength in the middle of the century.
The most significant changes expanding the scope of New York's

187.

377 N.E.2d 713, 715 (N.Y.1978).

188. See id.
at 719.
189. Id.
190. For another manifestation of this concern, see William E. Nelson, A Man's
Word and Making Money: Contract Law inNew York, 1920-1960, 19 Miss. C. L. Rnv.

1,20-28 (1998)
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law of fraud flowered from seeds planted during the 1920s and 1930s,
which had placed special duties of disclosure on fiduciaries and on cer-

tain parties with superior knowledge. Under case law as it developed by
1980, fiduciaries could be liable in fraud on the basis of "mere failure to
disclose,' 191 "misrepresentations of legal opinion, ' 192 "a promise of future performance, or a prophecy of future results."'193 Attorneys were
normally held to be fiduciaries, 194 since "[i]n our complex society... the
lawyer's opinion can be [an] instrument for inflicting pecuniary loss
' 195 Banks and trust compamore potent than the chisel or the crowbar,
196
nies were also held to be fiduciaries.
Fiduciary status was also extended to employers,' 97 franchisors, 9 '

191. Frigitemp Corp. v. Financial Dynamics Fund, Inc., 524 F.2d 275, 283 (2d Cir.
1975); accordIndustrial Bank of Commerce v. Snelling, 116 N.Y.S.2d 274,277 (City Ct.
N.Y. County 1952).
192. In re Levy's Estate, 244 N.Y.S.2d 22, 28 (1st Dep't 1963); accord Zacher v.
Bogie, 84 N.Y.S.2d 404, 406 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1948).
193. Brown v. Lockwood, 432 N.Y.S.2d 186, 195 (2d Dep't 1980); accord Dickinson v. Burnham, 197 F.2d 973, 981 (2d Cir. 1952).
194. See Slotkin v. Citizens Cas. Co., 614 F.2d 301, 314-16 (2d Cir. 1979); Chase
Manhattan Bank, N.A. v. Perla, 411 N.Y.S.2d 66, 68 (4th Dep't 1978); People v. Rosenstein, 402 N.Y.S.2d 151, 153-54 (Sup. Ct. Suffolk County 1978). A fiduciary relation
would not be found, however, when one attorney was dealing with another, see Amend v.
Hurley, 59 N.E.2d 416, 419-20 (N.Y. 1944), or when a lawyer simply failed "to detect
discrepancies between ... [a client's] description and technical reports available to him
in a physical sense but beyond his ability to understand." Securities and Exch. Comm'n
v. Frank, 388 F.2d 486, 489 (2d Cir. 1968). It was almost impossible for an attorney to
plead a fraud claim against a client. See Demov, Morris, Levin & Shein v. Glantz, 433
N.Y.S.2d 46, 47 (2d Dep't 1980).
195. Securities and Exch. Comm'n, 388 F.2d at 489 (quoting United States v. Benjamin, 328 F.2d 854, 863 (2d Cir. 1964).
196. See Scholen v. Guaranty Trust Co., 43 N.E.2d 28, 30 (N.Y. 1942).
197. See Schlansky v. United Merchants and Mfr., Inc., 443 F. Supp. 1054, 105960 (S.D.N.Y. 1977). But cf Smith v. Russell Sage College, 432 N.Y.S.2d 914, 916 (3d
Dep't 1980) (finding that because the employee neither relied upon nor was deceived by
the employer, fiduciary status did not extend to the employer).
198. See Mobil Oil Corp. v. Rubenfeld, 339 N.Y.S.2d 623, 632 (Civ. Ct. Queens
County 1972). But cf Ashton v. Chrysler Corp., 261 F. Supp. 1009, 1014 (E.D.N.Y.
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and operators of nursing homes.1 99 "The exact limitations of... a [fiduciary] relationship [were] impossible of statement," but the concept "embrace[d] both technical fiduciary relations and those informal relations
which exist whenever one man trusts in,and relies upon, another," including relationships "between close friends" or "based upon prior business dealings." 200 "[A] fiduciary relationship [was] grounded upon domination, which [did] not necessarily rest upon ownership of controlling
stock.... nor upon official title or office," but was "determined from all
the facts, conduct and circumstances of a given situation., 20 1 A fiduciary
relationship arose whenever the relations between the parties were:
of such a character as to render it certain that they do not deal on
terms of equality but that either on the one side from superior
knowledge... or from overmastering influence, or on the other
from weakness, dependence, or trust justifiably reposed, unfair
advantage in a transaction is rendered probable, there the burden
is shifted, the transaction is presumed void, and it is incumbent
upon the stronger party to show affirmatively that no deception
was practiced, no undue influence was used, and that all was fair,
open, voluntary and well understood.20 2
Without speaking in terms of a fiduciary relationship, other judges
agreed that "where one party to a transaction has superior knowledge, or
means of knowledge not open to both parties alike, he is under a legal

1965) (finding that the representations made were not fraudulent and that the plaintiffs
reliance on the representation was unjustified).
199. See Gordon v. Bialystoker Center & Bikur Cholim, Inc., 385 N.E.2d 285,
288-89 (N.Y. 1978).
200. Penato v. George, 383 N.Y.S.2d 900, 904-05 (2d Dep't 1976).
201. Oil & Gas Ventures-First 1958 Fund, Ltd. v. Kung, 250 F. Supp. 744, 749
(S.D.N.Y. 1966).
202. In re Estate of Phillips, 176 N.Y.S.2d 918, 923 (Sur. Ct. N.Y. County 1958).
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obligation to speak and his silence constitutes fraud. ' 2 °3 Likewise, they
held that "a misrepresentation ... made by an individual possessing su20 4
perior knowledge [could] be the predicate of a fraud action."

"[S]ilence" could also "constitute fraud where one of the two parties to a
contract has notice that the other is acting upon a mistaken belief as to a
material fact," 20 5 especially when the mistake resulted from the other's
less-than-complete disclosure of the truth.20 6 From these cases it was
203. State by Lefkowitz v. ITM, Inc., 275 N.Y.S.2d 303, 316 (Sup. Ct. N.Y.
County 1966). See, e.g., Dellefield v. Blockdel Realty Co., 128 F.2d 85, 90 (2d Cir.
1942).
204. Weinstein v. Schwartz, 107 N.Y.S.2d 337, 340 (Sup. Ct. Kings County
1951). On these bases, they sustained suits by an employee against an employer "possessed of substantial experience in the valuation of cars" for selling a car at an unfair
price, Forest v. Elliott Truck & Tractor Sales, Inc., 289 N.Y.S.2d 431, 432 (3d Dep't
1968), by a parent who had signed a release in a personal injury case on the basis of unfair impositions by an insurance adjuster, see Inman v. Merchants Mut. Ins. Co., 74
N.Y.S.2d 87, 89 (Sup. Ct. Tompkins County 1947); see also, e.g., Trombley v. Merchants
Mut. Ins. County, 360 N.Y.S.2d 829, 830 (Sup. Ct. Clinton County 1974), and by tenants
against landlords who refused to consent to subleases, and upon the tenants' removal
from the premises, leased directly to the proposed sublessees see Dress Shirt Sales, Inc. v.
Hotel Martinique Assocs., 239 N.Y.S.2d 660, 663 (1963) (dictum); Health & Beauty
Studios, Inc. v. Gray, 368 N.Y.S.2d 200, 201 (1st Dep't 1975). Other cases support the
general principle asserted in the text, see Magnaleasing, Inc. v. Staten Island Mall, 428 F.
Supp. 1039, 1043 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 563 F.2d 567 (2d Cir. 1977); Todd v. Pearl Woods,
Inc., 248 N.Y.S.2d 975, 977 (2d Dep't 1964); Kiamesha Dev. Corp. v. Guild Properties,
164 N.Y.S.2d 958, 962 (3d Dep't 1957); Greenberg v. Glickman, 50 N.Y.S.2d 489, 491
(Sup. Ct. Kings County 1944).
205. Warren Bros. Co. v. New York State Thruway Auth., 309 N.Y.S.2d 450, 452
(3d Dep't 1970); accord Frigitemp Corp. v. Financial Dynamics Fund, Inc., 524 F.2d
275, 282 (2d Cir. 1975); Miller v. National City Bank, 69 F. Supp. 187, 197 (S.D.N.Y.
1946), aff'd, 166 F.2d 723 (2d Cir. 1948); Green v. Hamilton Int'l Corp., 437 F. Supp.
723, 729 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
206. See Peerless Mills, Inc. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 527 F.2d 445, 449 (2d
Cir. 1975); Securities & Exch. Comm'n v. Great Am. Indus., Inc., 407 F.2d 453, 461 (2d
Cir. 1968); People v. National Cancer Hosp., 102 N.Y.S.2d 103, 107 (Sup. Ct. N.Y.
County 1951); Schlenoff v. Kroll, 141 N.Y.S.2d 370, 373 (N.Y. City Mun. Ct. 1955).
Thus, the state was held liable for fraud when its officials declared that plans for constructing a bridge were final when, in fact, final plans were frequently changed. See
Sheridan Drive-In, Inc. v. State, 228 N.Y.S.2d 576, 585 (4th Dep't 1962). This is similar
to a buyer of land who stated he wanted to use it for a summer camp and never disclosed
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easy to move to an analogous principle that "a person who has made a
berepresentation must correct that representation if it 20[subsequently]
7
comes false and if he knows people are relying on it.
A few cases went even further. Judge Friendly, for instance, declared
"negligence sufficient for tort liability where a person supplies false information to another with the intent to influence a transaction in which
he has a pecuniary interest." 2 5 A Brooklyn Civil Court judge held that a
buyer of an automobile had to pay the unpaid portion of the purchase
price even though the dealer thought the price had been fully paid, since
it was "no longer acceptable ... to conclude in knowing silence, a transaction damaging to a party who is mistaken about its basic factual assumptions." 20 9 One Second Circuit opinion even declared that "[a] representation made with an honest belief in its truth may still be" actionable
"because of lack of reasonable care in ascertaining the facts ... or absence of skill or competence required by a particular business or profession•,,210

This initiative, however, did not thrive. Led by the Supreme Court of
the United States, most judges would not follow it. The Supreme Court
was unwilling to recognize "a general duty between all participants in
market transactions to forgo actions based on material, nonpublic information" because "such a broad duty ... [would] depart radically from
2 11 as well as from the classical underpinnings of
... established doctrine"
a capitalist economy. The "general rule" was thus settled that:

his unique knowledge about its valuable mineral deposits. See Jansen v. Kelly, 200
N.Y.S.2d 561, 562 (3d Dep't 1960).
207. Fischer v. Kletz, 266 F. Supp. 180, 188 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); accord Bank v.
Board of Educ., 111 N.E.2d 238, 244 (N.Y. 1953).
208. Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 478 F.2d 1281, 1300 (2d Cir. 1973).
209. Gaines Serv. Leasing Corp. v. Carmel Plastic Corp., 432 N.Y.S.2d 760, 763
(Civ. Ct. Kings County 1980); accord Dale System, Inc. v. General Teleradio, Inc., 105
F. Supp. 745, 750 (S.D.N.Y. 1952) (dictum).
210. United States v. Garcia & Diaz, Inc., 291 F.2d 242, 245-46 (2d Cir. 1961)
(quoting 1 HARPER & JAMES,THB LAW OF TORTS 551).
211. Chiarellav. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 233 (1980).
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if the facts represented are not matters peculiarly within the [one]
party's knowledge, and the other party has the means available
to him of knowing, by the exercise of ordinary intelligence, the
truth ... , he must make use of those means, or he will not be
heard to complain that he was induced to enter into the transaction by misrepresentations.2 12
A person having "the opportunity to obtain knowledge of the facts" simply could "not sit idly by 2to13reap the harvest, if plentiful, but in the event
of scarcity, charge fraud."
In the end, then, a policy concern for opportunity and efficiency in a
capitalistic economy constrained judges' capacity to pursue a policy of
protecting the weak from economic actors with superior knowledge or
market power. The two policies were simply in tension with each other.
That tension was also especially apparent in a line of fraud cases dealing
with the enforceability of contract clauses declaring that the entire
agreement of the parties was embodied in the written contract and precluding recourse to parole evidence.
The modem line of cases began in 1957 with Sabo v. Delman, 14
where Judge Fuld, for a 5-2 majority of the New York Court of Appeals,
refused to permit a defendant to plead as a defense to a charge of fraud
that a provision in a written contract indicated that nothing except what
was contained in the writing would be binding on either party. Fuld reasoned that enforcing such a clause would put it in a defendant's "power
to perpetrate a fraud with immunity, depriving the victim of all redress,"
simply by virtue of having the "foresight" and the bargaining power "to

212. Danann Realty Corp. v. Harris, 157 N.E.2d 597, 600 (N.Y. 1959); accord
Perin v. Mardine Realty Co., 168 N.Y.S.2d 647, 648 (2d Dep't 1957); Brockton Assoc. v.
Weinbaum, 198 N.Y.S.2d 675, 677 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1960); Irvlor Realty Corp. v.
62-114 Imlay St. Corp., 151 N.Y.S.2d 191, 196 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1956).
213. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Kranz, 184 N.Y.S.2d 918, 921 (3d
Dep't 1959); accord Arndt v. Altman, 49 N.Y.S.2d 706, 708 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County
1943).

214.

143 N.E.2d 906, 909-10 (N.Y. 1957).
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include a merger clause in the agreement." 215 In a later case, however, a
majority, over Fuld's dissent, quickly carved out an exception to Sabo,
when the majority refused to allow a plaintiff to maintain a fraud claim
on the basis of a representation which a written settlement of a divorce
dispute specifically stated had not been made.216 The majority acted
without opinion for the obvious reason, later noted by Fuld, that the case
was "a most unusual one" involving "an agreement designed to settle
pending marital litigation" and thereby promote judicial efficiency.217 218
The final, dispositive case was Danann Realty Corp. v. Harris,
where the majority barred a fraud suit by a purchaser of a lease because
the sale contract contained general language that the seller had not made
the sorts of representations on which the purchaser was basing a suit. In
DanannRealty Corp., the majority reasoned that any other result would
make it "impossible for two businessmen dealing at arm's length to agree
that the buyer [was] not buying in reliance on any representations of the
seller as to a particular fact." 21 9 This policy of promoting business efficiency, as Fuld reminded the majority in another dissent, was nevertheless in tension with "everyday experience" that people with inferior bargaining power often accepted "exculpatory clauses ... in reliance upon
the honesty of supposed friends, the plausible and disarming statements
of salesmen, or the customary course of business. 220
215. Id. at 161.
216. See Cohen v. Cohen, 144 N.E.2d 649, 649 (N.Y. 1957).
217. Danann Realty Corp., 157 N.E.2d at 605 (dissenting opinion).

218.

157 N.E.2d 597, 604 (N.Y. 1959).

219. Id. at 600.
220. Id. at 601. To a significant degree, Fuld lost the battle in Danann Realty but

won the war when the Court of Appeals held in Wittenberg v. Robinov, 173 N.E.2d 868,
869 (N.Y. 1961), that a merger clause disclaiming specific representations barred suit
only against the contracting party and not the party's agents and when lower courts on the
whole read particular merger clauses as fitting within the Sabo rather than the Danann
Realty principle. See Stryker v. Rusch, 187 N.Y.S.2d 663, 665 (3d Dep't 1959); Warshavsky v. Worthington Equity Corp., 203 N.Y.S.2d 538, 540 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County
1960); Joyner v. Albert Merrill Sch., 411 N.Y.S.2d 988, 993-94 (Civ. Ct. N.Y. County
1978) (DanannRealty applies only in cases when a plaintiff had opportunity to learn true

facts).
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Tradeoffs between competing policy values also affected the development of doctrine dealing with the measure of damages. Thus, the New

York Court of Appeals held that punitive damages were available in
fraud cases essentially for reasons of business efficiency-"not only to
punish ... but to deter .... those who deliberately and coolly engage in
a far-flung fraudulent scheme, systematically conducted for profit," at

the expense of the economy at large.2 21 A lower court also granted punitive damages against a school that had, with no concern for economic
efficiency, induced students to enroll in "courses neither suited to an applicant's needs nor the job market.' 222 Punitive damages could also be

assessed to redress bargaining inequalities, as was done against a credit
firm that "for many years" had "implement[ed] a broad consumer fraud
scheme, victimizing thousands of residents of ghetto areas .... ,223 in
contrast to the state judges, federal judges applying New York law in
diversity cases were hostile to punitive damage claims, which they feared
would open "the door.., for plaintiffs in deceit actions ... to manufacture the jurisdictional amount ... and thereby gain224unwarranted access
to" and decrease the efficiency of the federal courts.

Concerns for economic efficiency were important on other occasions, as when the New York Court of Appeals, recognizing that "foreign
currency reserves are of vital importance to ... a friendly nation," al-

lowed a fraud suit by a Brazilian bank.225 So too were concerns for judi-

221. Walker v. Sheldon, 179 N.E.2d 497,498-99 (N.Y. 1961).
222. Joyner, 411 N.Y.S.2d at 995.
223. Star Credit Corp. v. Ingram, 347 N.Y.S.2d 651, 652 (Civ. Ct. N.Y. County
1973). Punitive damages were allowed only in cases of "fraud 'aimed at the public generally,"' where the goals of economic efficiency and redressing imbalances of societal
power could be attained. Vinlis Constr. Co. v. Roreck, 262 N.E.2d 215, 216 (N.Y. 1970).
But see Banco Nacional de Costa Rica v. Bremar Holdings Corp., 492 F. Supp. 364, 37374 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); Borkowski v. Borkowski, 355 N.E.2d 287, 289 (N.Y. 1976) (dic-

tam).
224. DuPont Galleries, Inc. v. International Magne-Tape, Ltd., 300 F. Supp. 1179,
1182 (S.D.N.Y. 1969); accordFritz v. Warner-Lambert Pharm. Co., 349 F. Supp. 1250,
1252-53 (E.D.N.Y. 1972).
225. Banco Frances e Brasileiro S.A. v. Doe, 331 N.E.2d 502, 506 (N.Y. 1975).
See also Reliance Ins. Co. v. Daly, 329 N.Y.S.2d 504, 506 (2d Dep't 1972) (requiring
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cial efficiency, as when the appellate division, in passing upon an issue
of damages, observed that, when "the ordinary standards" for measuring
available," it would "resort to some practical means
damages were "not
226
that will be just.
Concerns for efficient functioning of the economy and the courts
thus put a significant brake on the development of the law of fraud. Old
moralistic concerns about full disclosure and free consent had almost no
impact on legal development, and even the newer policy of protecting the
ignorant and the weak from the knowledgeable and the strong had only
limited impact. In the second half of the twentieth century, concerns for
business efficiency, freedom of opportunity, and upward mobility largely
triumphed over the nineteenth-century norms of justice that had lingered
from the first half of the century as a motivating force for legal change.
These same concerns even provided resistance to the newer norm of
equality.
B. Interference with Economic Relationships
The law sanctioning interference with contractual and other economic relationships witnessed, even more explicitly, the triumph of utilitarian efficiency and freedom of opportunity over business morality. The
triumph occurred more slowly than in some other doctrinal areas, however, as the "expansive tendencies of actions ... for tortious interferences with a relationship contractual" 227 continued to manifest themselves during the two decades at the mid-point of the century. Courts
continued for some years to hold that the malice required to maintain an

insurance company to defend suit against insured who had defrauded it, but permitting it
to sue insured for fraud).
226. Mills Studio, Inc. v. Chenango Valley Realty Corp., 221 N.Y.S.2d 684, 68788 (3d Dep't 1961). Similar flexibility with regard to damages was shown in other cases.
See Towers Realty Corp. v. Fox, 103 N.Y.S.2d 437, 438 (1st Dep't 1951); Richard Silk
Co. v. Bernstein, 82 N.Y.S.2d 647, 649-50 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1948); Paramount
Pictures, Inc. v. Brandt, 84 N.Y.S.2d 64, 68 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1948).
227. Benton v. Kennedy-Van Saun Mfg. & Eng'g Co., 145 N.Y.S.2d 703, 706
(Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1955), affd, 152 N.Y.S.2d 955 (lst Dep't 1956).
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interference suit need not be actual malice, 22 8 but merely "the intentional
doing of a wrongful act without legal or social justification."22 9 They also
held that actions for interference could be maintained even if the plaintiff
had an enforceable claim against the other contracting party2 30 or if the
interference resulted in harm to the plaintiff short of a breach. 231 Finally,
they declared that "interference with pre-contractual relations [was] actionable where a contract would have been entered into [but] for the malicious conduct of a third person."2 32 Apart from cases reiterating the
principle that a "person is generally privileged to interfere with a contract
interest where such interference is made in protection of an equal or superior right,'2 33 most cases involved specific factual determinations that
plaintiffs either had2 34 or had not235 made out their claims.
228. See A.S. Rampell, Inc. v. Hyster Co., 144N.E.2d 371,375-76 (N.Y. 1957).
229. Calvada Inc. v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., 139 N.Y.S.2d 92, 95 (Sup. Ct. Kings
County 1955) (quoting Hornstein v. Podwitz, 173 N.E. 674, 674 (N.Y. 1930); accord
Katz v. Thompson, 189 N.Y.S.2d 982, 986 (Westchester County Ct. 1959).
230. Id.at 986.
231. See Metropolitan Opera Ass'n v. Wagner-Nichols Recorder Corp., 101
N.Y.S.2d 483, 498 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1950), aff'd, 107 N.Y.S.2d 795 (1st Dep't
1950); Haggerty v. Burkey Mills, Inc., 211 F. Supp. 835, 837 (E.D.N.Y. 1962).
232. A.S. Rampell, Inc., 144 N.E.2d at 375.
233. Burr v. Carvel Dari-Freeze Stores, Inc., 191 N.Y.S.2d 235, 237 (Sup. Ct. Suffolk County 1959). See, e.g., Terry v. Dairymen's League Coop. Ass'n, 157 N.Y.S.2d 71,
78 (3d Dep't 1956) (defendant acted "in ordinary course of business... to serve its interests"); Martin v. Mantell, 167 N.Y.S.2d 198, 200 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1957) (defendant acted to avoid "unreliable... tenant").
234. See Gold Medal Farms, Inc. v. Rutland County Coop. Creamery, Inc., 195
N.Y.S.2d 179, 184-85 (3d Dep't 1960); Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Technical Tape
Corp., 192 N.Y.S.2d 102, 119 (Sup. Ct. Westchester County 1959); Kaplan v. Kaplan,
133 N.Y.S.2d 59, 61 (Sup. Ct. Westchester County 1954); Delehanty v. Walzer, 59
N.Y.S.2d 777, 792-93 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1945).
235. See Associated Flour Haulers & Warehousemen, Inc. v. Hoffman, 26 N.E.2d
7, 10 (N.Y. 1940); Best Window Co. v. Better Bus. Bureau, 151 N.Y.S.2d 833, 834 (1st
Dep't 1956); Photographic Importing & Distrib. Corp. v. Elgeet Optical Co., 122
N.Y.S.2d 215, 216 (1st Dep't 1953); Noah v. L. Daitch & Co., 192 N.Y.S.2d 380, 385
(Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1959); Burrus v. Scott, 178 N.Y.S.2d 416, 418 (Sup. Ct. Queens
County 1958); Lance Television Labs., Inc. v. Certified Appliance Co., 99 N.Y.S.2d 485,
487 (Sup. Ct. Bronx County 1950); Rizika v. Potter, 72 N.Y.S.2d 372, 376-77 (Sup. Ct.
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Another related doctrine that, in the language of the New York Court
of Appeals, was "still in the process of growth" during the 1940s and
1950s was the doctrine of prima facie tort.23 6 This doctrine, which had
originated in the case of Al Raschid v. News Syndicate Co., 23 7 provided
the mechanism whereby "in modem business dealings the zone of liabil23 8
ity against those causing injury to others [was] gradually expanding.
"New torts [were] created every day" pursuant to the "expanding doctrine ' 239 of prima facie tort to deal with the "infliction of intentional
harm, resulting in damage, without legal excuse or justification" 240 and
with defendants who subjected plaintiffs "to economic pressures
and...
241
thereby injur[ed] their business without justification in law.
Advance Music Corporation v. American Tobacco Company was a
case where an unethical business practice was held on the pleadings to be
a prima facie tort. In Advance Music Corporation, the plaintiff asserted
that his song was among the most popular songs in the nation and that
because the Hit Parade failed to conduct surveys to determine a song's
actual ranking, despite representations otherwise, the Hit Parade failed to
play the plaintiffs song as one of its top ten songs. 242 Another case, Ruiz
v. Bertolotti, was successfully brought under the prima facie tort rubric
by a Puerto Rican husband and wife who sought to buy a house in a residential section of Long Island, New York, and alleged that the defendant
Oneida County 1947). Two interesting Court of Appeals cases denied plaintiffs recovery
on the ground of the nonexistence of contracts, in one case because the plaintiff had already lost a breach of contract suit against the principal obligor. See Israel v. Wood Dolson Co., 134 N.E.2d 97, 99 (N.Y. 1956). The other case was because the contract was
illegal. See Paramount Pad Co. v. Baumrind, 151 N.E.2d 609, 610 (N.Y. 1958).
236. Rager v. McCloskey, 111 N.E.2d 214,217 (N.Y. 1953).
237. 191 N.E. 713, 714 (N.Y. 1934).
238. Advance Music Corp. v. American Tobacco Co., 50 N.Y.S.2d 287, 292 (Sup.
Ct. N.Y. County 1944).
239. Herbert Prods., Inc. v. Oxy-Dry Sprayer Corp., 145 N.Y.S.2d 168, 171 (Sup.
Ct. N.Y. County 1955).
240. Gantell v. Friedmann, 197 N.Y.S.2d 605, 608 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1959).
241. United M.P.B. Novelty Mfg. Corp. v. Sinensky, 219 N.Y.S.2d 729, 731 (Sup.
Ct. Kings County 1961).
242.

See Advance Music Corp., 70 N.E.2d at 402-03.
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"expressed anger at 'colored persons' moving into the neighborhood, and
threatened bodily harm" to the seller and to the plaintiffs, to "frighten"

them into "surrender[ing] their legal right to buy a house where they
pleased. 2 43 Other successful suits were brought against an attorney who
gave perjured testimony before an official referee, 244 against a labor union that refused to admit women to membership and picketed an establishment employing women, 245 against a business associate who falsely
reported information about the plaintiff's income to the Internal Revenue

Service,2 46 and against a landlord who harassed
his tenant by bringing
2 47
"baseless lawsuits" in connection with the lease.

243. Ruiz v. Bertolotti, 236 N.Y.S.2d 854, 855 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1962).
But cf.Proctor v. Mount Vernon Arena, Inc., 40 N.Y.S.2d 775, 777 (2d Dep't 1943),
(reversed a judgment on behalf of an African-American child who had been denied admission to a skating rink on the ground, which the defendant had failed to plead or prove
at trial, that the child was a minor by statute who could not be admitted to the rink unless
accompanied by a parent or guardian).
244. See Nones v. Security Title & Guaranty Co., 162 N.Y.S.2d 761, 762 (Sup. Ct.
Nassau County 1956).
245. See Wilson v. Hacker, 101 N.Y.S.2d 461, 464-66 (Sup. Ct. Erie County

1950).
246. See Gale v. Ryan, 31 N.Y.S.2d 732, 733 (1st Dep't 1941). But see Kaufman
v. M.T. Davidson Co., 76 N.Y.S.2d 893, 894 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1947) (labor union
could not sue employer for opposing wage increases before War Labor Board).
247. See J. Theatres, Inc. v. V.R.O.K. Co., 96 N.Y.S.2d 271, 272 (Sup. Ct. N.Y.
County 1950). For other cases in which plaintiffs were permitted to go forward with their
suits, see generally Schisgall v. Fairchild Publications, Inc., 137 N.Y.S.2d 312 (Sup. Ct.
N.Y. Court 1955); Kasten v. Vincent Edwards, Inc., 87 N.Y.S.2d 777 (Sup. Ct. N.Y.
County 1949); Girard Trust Co. v. Melville Shoe Corp, 81 N.Y.S.2d 900 (Sup. Ct. N.Y.
County 1948); Ledwith v. International Paper Co., 64 N.Y.S.2d 810 (Sup. Ct. N.Y.
County 1946). The main grounds on which prima facie tort suits were dismissed were
that the plaintiff failed to make a sufficient showing of damages, see Simon v. Noma
Elec. Corp, 56 N.E.2d 537, 539-540 (N.Y. 1944); Goldfarb v. Strauss, 212 N.Y.S.2d 579,
580 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1961); Marcus v. Textron, Inc., 177 N.Y.S.2d 964, 966
(Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1958); that the defendant lacked an intention to harm the plaintiff,
see Shostakovich v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 80 N.Y.S.2d 575, 579 (Sup. Ct.
N.Y. County 1948); and that the plaintiff's injury could be remedied through some traditional category of tort action, see Rager v. McCloskey, 111 N.E.2d 214, 217 (N.Y. 1953);
Green v. Time, Inc., 147 N.Y.S.2d 828, 830 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1955).
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Beginning around 1960, however, the judiciary's enthusiasm for the
doctrines of prima facie tort and interference with contractual relations
began to wane. The first clear sign of the loss of enthusiasm was the
1958 Court of Appeals decision in Brandt v. Winchell,248 where the organizer of the Cancer Welfare Fund had sued the well-known reporter,
columnist, and commentator, Walter Winchell, and the New York philanthropist, Elmer H. Bobst, for inducing various public officials to investigate and ultimately destroy public confidence in the Cancer Fund so
that it could not remain as an effective competitor for Winchell's and
Bobst's Damon Runyon Fund. In a decision containing no dissent, New
York Court of Appeals Chief Judge Conway agreed that the "law [was]
now settled" that an "act done solely out of malice and ill will to injure
another may be actionable." 249 But that was "not to say," Conway continued, "that the present state of the law is that an act ... will, without
exception, become actionable when it is done with... blameworthy purpose." 250 There were always "reasons [why] a court [might be] constrained to ignore the wrongful motive of an actor," such as "the paramount consideration of the public welfare.",251 Whenever a claim was
made, either in a prima facie tort case or in an interference with contractual relations case--"that an otherwise lawful act ha[d] become unlawful
because the actor's motives were malevolent"--it was necessary "to analyze and weigh the conflicting interests of the parties and of the public. '252 On doing so in Brandt, the New York Court of Appeals unanimously dismissed Brandt's suit.
In the next case that came before the New York Court of Appeals,
the plaintiffs claimed that a prima facie tort or interference suit would
"lie in favor of anyone whose contractual expectations ha[d] been indirectly injured by socially undesirable conduct" when "the injury was

248.
249.
250.
251.
252.

148 N.E.2d 160 (N.Y. 1958).
Id. at 163.
Id. at 163-64.
Id.
Id. at 164. (emphasis in original).
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foreseeable by defendant. ' 253 Observing that under the plaintiff's "theory
it might well be argued that, anytime a debtor refused to pay a creditor,
the creditors of that creditor would have a cause of action against the
debtor for interfering with the contract between the debtor's creditor and
this creditor's creditor," the court concluded that "[t]he law [did] not
spread its protection so far" and that "nothing but... confusion [could]
be accomplished by allowing this suit to continue." 254
Lower courts agreed that what one of them called "the law of tortious interference with economic relations" was not always "based on
sound logic," that "[a]nalysis of the various elements comprising the tort
ha[d] been lacking," and that its "parameters" were "not ...as clearly
defined as those areas of the law which enjoyed less erratic development."255 Because the scope of the tort was "limitless, there [was] danger
that its unrestricted use [might] lead to grave abuse and unwarranted
claims." 2 6 Although courts recognized that prima facie tort and comparable doctrines had "proved useful in assisting the development of
needed reforms" as "new relationships and power groupings formed, and
continuously reformed, in the business world," they nevertheless thought
it "unwise" to set "aside large bodies of case law which have defined our
limits, established our guidelines and set forth the essential elements of
traditional tort" and thereby "to allow every unrealized cause of action to
be tortured into a primafacie tort action. 257 They would not permit the
development of a general law of interference with economic relationfor every cause of acships that would "become a 'catch-all' alternative
258
legs."
own
its
on
stand
not
[could]
which
tion
This about-face in judicial attitude did not mean that no one recov-

253. Sloan v. Clark, 223 N.E.2d 893, 896 (N.Y. 1966).
254. Id. at 895.
255. Ryan v. Brooklyn Eye & Ear Hosp., 360 N.Y.S.2d 912, 916 (2d Dep't 1974).
256. Frank v. 903 Park Ave. Co., 354 N.Y.S.2d 329, 331 n.1 (Civ. Ct. N.Y.
County 1974).
257. Belsky v. Lowenthal, 405 N.Y.S.2d 63, 65 (1st Dep't 1978), aff'don opinion
below, 47 N.Y.2d 820 (1979).
258. Id.
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ered for prima facie tort or for interference with contractual relationships.
Suits were upheld, for example, against unethical attorneys, 59 against a
doctor who gave an insurer a false diagnosis that caused a plaintiff to

lose disability benefits, 2 60 against a labor union that used threats of intimidation and ordered its members not to cross a picket line of another
union for the purpose of inducing breach of a collective bargaining
agreement, 261 and against employees of a Japanese corporation for their
disruptive and harassing office behavior in support of their claim that the
corporation
discriminated against women who were not Japanese nation2
als.

26

Still, the change in judicial approach produced dramatic transformations in doctrine. Thus, in a number of cases in the 1960s and 1970s,
judges reached results that were precisely opposite of those that other
judges had reached a few decades earlier. Suits for interference with contract rights were not permitted, for example, when a plaintiff had an enforceable suit for breach of contract against the principal obligor,263 when
a contract was voidable because it was not in writing as required by the
Statute of Frauds,264 or when the claim was that the defendant attempted

259. See Board of Educ. v. Farmingdale Classroom Teachers Ass'n, 343 N.E.2d
278 (N.Y. 1975); Riverside Fin. Corp. v. Coniglio Builders, Inc., 425 N.Y.S.2d 433 (4th
Dep't 1980); Racoosin v. LeSchack & Grodensky, P.C., 426 N.Y.S.2d 707 (Sup. Ct. N.Y.
County 1980).
260. See Felis v. Greenberg, 273 N.Y.S.2d 288 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1966). But
cf Clark v. Geraci, 208 N.Y.S.2d 564, 567-68 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1960) (plaintiff
could not object to doctor's full disclosure of his health where he had authorized doctor
in the past to make incomplete disclosures).
261. See generally American Broad. Co. v. Brandt, 287 N.Y.S.2d 719, 723 (Sup.
Ct. N.Y. County 1968).(Upholding that tortious interference with business by threat of
intimidation will afford a common law action).
262. See Avigliano v. Sumitomo Shoji Am., Inc., 473 F. Supp. 506, 516 (S.D.N.Y.
1979). Plaintiffs also enjoyed at least some success in Herzog & Straus v. GRT Corp.,
553 F.2d 789 (2d Cir. 1977); Sadowy v. Sony Corp., 496 F. Supp. 1071 (S.D.N.Y. 1980);
Jewelcor Inc. v. Pearlman, 397 F. Supp. 221 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Harris Diamond Co. v.
Army Times Pub. Co., 280 F. Supp. 273 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
263. See Stevens v. Siegel, 239 N.Y.S.2d 827, 828 (2d Dep't 1963).
264. See Livoti v. Elston, 384 N.Y.S.2d 484, 485-86 (2d Dep't 1976).
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unsuccessfully to interfere with contractual relations.265 Similarly, it was
determined that a defendant did not commit a tort when he gave inteninformation about a plaintiff's income to the Internal
tionally misleading
266
Revenue Service.
Far more important, however, was the transformation that occurred
in the policies underlying the law of interference with economic relations. Whereas the classic law of the 1920s and 1930s had reflected adherence to moral views grounded in hostility to coerced redistribution of
wealth, the new law of the 1960s and 1970s was concerned with business
efficiency, freedom of opportunity, upward social mobility, and proper
operation of the judiciary and other agencies of government. This was
the same policy transformation that had occurred in the law of fraud.
In the new policy world of the 1960s and 1970s, judges spoke of "the
policy of fostering free enterprise" and of a person's right "to advance
his own economic self-interest. ' 267 They recognized "that the mere occurrence of damage to a business resulting from competition carried on
in good faith [did] not give rise to a cause of action," 268 and looked on a
desire to increase profits as "sound economic policy when dealing with
one's own property., 269 For these reasons, the courts refused to sustain
prima facie tort claims, and frowned on suits for interference with con270
tract rights when a defendant "had a valid business interest to protect"

265. See Lynnv. Cohen, 359 F. Supp. 565, 569-70 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
266. See Penn-Ohio Steel Corp. v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 280 N.Y.S.2d 679,
680-81 (lstDep't 1967).

267. Robbins v. Ogden Corp., 490 F. Supp. 801, 811 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
268. Royal Farms, Inc. v. Minute Maid Co., 236 N.Y.S.2d 368, 369 (Sup. Ct.
Kings County 1962).

269. Williamson, Picket, Gross, Inc. v. 400 Park Ave. Co., 405 N.Y.S.2d 709, 711
(lst Dep't 1978).

270. Luxonomy Cars, Inc. v. Citibank, N.A., 408 N.Y.S.2d 951, 954 (2d Dep't
1978); see also Williamson, Picket, Gross, Inc. v. 400 Park Avenue Co., 391 N.E.2d 296,
296 (N.Y. 1979); Felsen v. Sol Cafe Mfg. Corp., 249 N.E.2d 459, 461 (N.Y. 1969); Ansonia Assocs. v. Ansonia Residents' Ass'n, 434 N.Y.S.2d 370, 374 (1st Dep't 1980); Fox
v. Congel, 426 N.Y.S.2d 878, 880-81 (3d Dep't 1980); Global Casting Indus., Inc. v.

Daley-Hodkin Corp., 432 N.Y.S.2d 453, 456 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1980); cf. Gold-
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or believed "that an employee who sought to frustrate the decisions of
the organization employing him had outlived his usefulness." 271 One
judge even went so far as to urge that "each business enterprise must be
free to select its business relations in its own interest" and that, under
New York law, it was "well-settled... that the refusal to maintain trade
relations with any individual is an inherent right which every person may
exercise lawfully." 272
A parallel policy was the concern for the proper and effective functioning of government and its courts. At a most concrete level, judges
grew hostile to claims of interference with economic rights for fear of
"affording a forum for a never ending source of new litigation." 273 They

were also concerned that claims for interference with economic rights not
be permitted to arise out of the defendants' presentation of information
or grievances to appropriate government authorities, 274 including the
courts.275 The courts also displayed due deference to the decisions of

other agencies of government.276

stein v. Garlick, 318 N.Y.S.2d 370, 375-76 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1971) (protection of
efficiency in functioning of newspaper).
271. Stillman v. Ford, 238 N.E.2d 304, 306-07 (N.Y. 1968); accord Widger v.
Central Sch. Dist., 247 N.Y.S.2d 364, 368 (4th Dep't 1964); Smith v. Helbraun, 238
N.Y.S.2d 212, 219 (Sup. Ct. Westchester County 1963).
272. Shaitelman v. Phoenix Mut. Life Ins. Co., 517 F. Supp. 21, 25 (S.D.N.Y.
1980).
273. Belsky v. Lowenthal, 405 N.Y.S.2d 62, 65 (1st Dep't 1978), affd on opinion
below, 392 N.E.2d 560 (N.Y. 1979).
274. See Altimus v. Manhood Found., Inc., 425 F. Supp. 1118, 1124-26 (S.D.N.Y.
1976); Davis v. Williams, 379 N.E.2d 158, 158-59 (N.Y. 1978); Rudoff v. Huntington
Symphony Orchestra, Inc., 397 N.Y.S.2d 863, 865 (Sup. Ct. 1977).
275. See Artvale, Inc. v. Rugby Fabrics Corp., 232 F. Supp. 814, 822 (S.D.N.Y.
1964); Tuvim v. 10 E. 30 Corp., 329 N.Y.S.2d 275, 278 (1st Dep't 1972).
276. See e.g., Alberta Gas Chem., Ltd. v. Celanese Corp., 497 F. Supp. 637
(S.D.N.Y. 1980); Catterson v. Caso, 472 F. Supp. 833 (E.D.N.Y. 1979). For other significant cases in which relief for interference with economic relations was denied, see Alvord
& Swift v. Stewart M. Muller Constr. Co., 385 N.E.2d 1238 (N.Y. 1978); Robert A.
Bodes, Inc. v. Westinghouse Broad. Co., 288 N.Y.S.2d 697 (1st Dep't 1968); Metromedia, Inc. v. Mandel, 249 N.Y.S.2d 806 (1st Dep't 1964).
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The issues underlying the transformation of prima facie tort doctrine
and the law of interference with contractual relations emerged with
greatest clarity, however, in Guard-Life Corp. v. S. Parker Hardware
ManufacturingCorp.,277 a contractual relations case decided by a closely
divided New York Court of Appeals. The three dissenters in Guard-Life
contended that "the raison d'etre of the law of interference with contractual relations" was "the ethical precept that one competitor must keep his
hands off of the contracts of another., 278 In their view, "the law ha[d]
decided, long ago, that enforcement of certain market morals [was] a societal interest worthy of protection., 279 "If society were interested only in
fostering economic competition," they added, "the tort of contractual
interference would never have developed," and "the law would have allowed business entities to engage in unfettered competition. ' ' " It was in
pursuit of moral values that the dissenters were prepared to keep teeth in
the law of contractual interference and to grant the plaintiff the relief it
demanded.
The four-judge majority, in contrast, was hostile to classic doctrine,
which it found "inconstant and mutable, drawing its substance from the
circumstances of the particular situation at hand."2 ' In deciding particular cases, it was necessary:
to achieve a balancing of the protection of the interests of the one
party in future enjoyment of contract performance and society's
interest in respect for the integrity of contractual relationships,
on the one hand, and, on the other, the right to freedom of action
on the part of the party interfering and society's concern that
competition not be unduly hampered.282

277.
278.
279.
280.
281.
282.

406 N.E.2d 445 (N.Y. 1980).
Id. at 454.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 448.
Id.
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The majority was especially hostile to making "the result hinge on
the subjective ... state of mind of the parties" or on the related "ethical
considerations ... urged by the dissenters as having a bearing. ' 28 3 The
majority, that is, was not prepared to reward economic actors with good
intentions or to punish those with plans for evil; in the majority's view,
"the imposition of liability ... must depend on the worth and signifibusiness, govcance of the objective interest"--presumably economic,
284
ernmental, and judicial efficiency- "to be protected.,
As we have seen, the majority's approach had come to dominate the
New York judiciary by the time Guard-Life was decided in 1980. Thus,
although the courts had maintained a limited willingness to protect the
ignorant and the weak from the knowledgeable and the strong, they had
more often let their concerns for business efficiency, freedom of opportunity, and upward social mobility override established precedents calling for the enforcement of business morality. This same pattern of judicial decision making was also true in a third area of the law regulating
business conduct-the law of conversion.
C. Conversion
Like the doctrines of fraud and interference with contractual relationships, the doctrine of conversion was put to novel uses. In one case, for
example, a man claimed that, when his deceased wife's body was disinterred from a cemetery in Rahway, New Jersey, for reburial in Yugoslavia, the funeral director in charge converted the waterproof airtight casket in which she had been buried and replaced it with an inexpensive tin
casket.2 85 In another case, a dispute arose over whether the 10,000-yearold skeleton of a mastodon (an extinct mammal resembling an elephant),
found beneath the roadbed of Interstate 84 while it was under construction, belonged to the state or to the fee simple owner of the land.286 There

283. Id. at 450.
284. Id.
285. Skalko v. Barrett, 415 N.Y.S.2d 856, 857 (lstDep't 1979).
286. Hunterfly Realty Corp. v. State, 346 N.Y.S.2d 455, 456-57 (Cl. Ct. 1973).
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were also cases involving disputes over former marital property between
spouses who had divorced or separated,287 and between family members
following the death of a relative with the power of signature over a joint
account concerning the disposition of the account's proceeds. 288
The reporting of these cases-indeed, the cases themselves-may
have been quirks of fortune, but other cases were not. Several cases
arose, for example, out of new, harsher enforcement policies by the government. In one federal case, the customs service made an "illegal" seizure of imported books, such as Thomas Paine's Age of Reason, apparently for their "subversive character," held the books for some six
months, and then released the books after requests for judicial review
arose-all to the substantial damage of the importer.289 In another case, a
claim was made of "conversion" by "duress" when "agents and employees of the Government" by "various threats and acts,... coerced" a party
into a "compromise agreement and [into] paying $26,000 to the Government thereunder." 290 On the state level, two cases arose out of a
change in policy made by the district attorney of Westchester County and
by a county court judge who wrote opinions in support of that change.2 9'
The district attorney seems to have instituted a policy of not returning
non-contraband items seized pursuant to lawful police searches, even
though the individuals from whom the items were seized either were not
indicted or were acquitted of criminal charges. The judge, in turn, supported the district attorney's policy, concluding that the want of indictment or conviction was "not a determination of the question of" an individual's "ownership or right to possession of the money taken from him"
and that the individual would have to pass procedural hurdles and sustain
287. See e.g., Lerman v. Lerman, 431 N.Y.S.2d 253 (Sup. Ct. Albany County
1980); Moran v. Moran, 346 N.Y.S.2d 424 (Dist. Ct. Suffolk County 1973).
288. See Brown v. Bowery Say. Bank, 415 N.E.2d 906 (N.Y.1980); Schwartz v.
Schwartz, 365 N.Y.S.2d 584 (Civ. Ct. N.Y. County 1974).
289. Truth Seeker Co. v. Duming, 147 F.2d 54, 56 (2d Cir. 1945).
290. United States v. Ein Chem. Corp., 161 F. Supp. 238,246 (S.D.N.Y. 1958).
291. See Errico v. County of Westchester, 242 N.Y.S.2d 524 (Westchester County
Ct. 1963); Kamienska v. County of Westchester, 241 N.Y.S.2d 814 (Westchester County
Ct. 1963).
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292
a high burden of proof to recover it.
Another line of cases grew out of the breakup of employment relationships. The cases involved such practices as a refusal by former law
partners to allow a partner leaving the firm to take his books and office
equipment with him,293 a former employee's destruction of computer
programs he had been preparing on his job,2 94 and a former employer's
breaking into the former employee's office and searching his files. 295 The
behavior of parties in the cases was sufficiently egregious to warrant the
award of punitive damages in the two cases that went to judgment, while
in the third case, which was still at the pleading stage, punitive damages
were not foreclosed.
These cases surely suggest that traditional marketplace ethics were
breaking down, with litigation becoming an increasingly common and
viable alternative to gentlemanly resolution of business disputes. Merrick
v. FourStar Stage Lighting, Inc.,2 96 a case in which "a well-known stage
producer" 297 sought to repossess stage lighting equipment from a business that supplied and stored it, provides further evidence from its "convoluted course" and "acrimonious history." 298 Harper & Row, Publish2 99 was another case that pointed to the
ers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises
breakdown of traditional business ethics. In that case, Harper & Row,
which was publishing a biography of former President Gerald Ford and
had licensed Time, Inc. to pre-publish book excerpts, claimed that the

292. See Errico,242 N.Y.S.2d at 527.
293. See Ashare v. Mirkin, Barre, Saltzstein & Gordon, P.C., 435 N.Y.S.2d 438,
439 (Sup. Ct. Suffolk County 1980).
294. See Veeco Instruments, Inc. v. Candido, 334 N.Y.S.2d 321, 323 (Sup. Ct.
Nassau County 1972).
295. See Health Delivery Sys. Inc. v. Scheinman, 344 N.Y.S.2d 190, 192 (2d

Dep't 1973).
296. 378 N.Y.S.2d 65 (lstDep't 1975).

297. Id. at 66.
298. Merrick v. Four Star Stage Lighting, Inc., 400 N.Y.S.2d 543, 544 (1st Dep't
1978); see also Four Star Stage Lighting, Inc. v. Merrick, 392 N.Y.S.2d 297 (1st Dep't

1977).
299. 501 F. Supp. 848 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
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defendant had committed the tort of conversion by obtaining a copy of
the Ford manuscript without authorization, and by publishing excerpts of
it in The Nation before Time had published the excerpts. Because of The
Nation Inc.'s actions, Time canceled its licensing arrangement with
Harper & Row.
Federal Insurance Co. v. Fries300 was another case in which the
breakdown of traditional patterns of ethical behavior brought litigants to
court claiming conversion. In FederalInsurance Co., a bank, serving as
an executor, mistakenly delivered rings belonging to a different estate to
Fries, an heir, who was unaware of the mistake; sold the rings for cash;
and then spent it. Two years later, the bank discovered the mistake and
demanded the return of the rings. Declining to abide by a traditional ethical concept of not keeping property that was not rightfully his own, Fries
refused to return them. The bank sought reimbursement from its insurance company, which paid for the loss and then, unmindful of its insurer's duty to cover losses that could no longer be readily undone, sued
Fries to recover the cash. With this suit, the ethical dilemmas of whether
an heir should keep a windfall to which he or she was not entitled but
had already spent, and of whether an insurance company should cover a
loss that had produced a windfall for another, were transformed into a
legal problem of whether, for purposes of the statute of limitations, conversion occurred when Fries received the rings, sold the rings, or refused
the bank's demand for their return.
D. Privacy
Developments in the law of privacy paralleled events in other areas.
Many cases continued along established channels that permitted newsworthy but not commercial appropriation of the name or likeness of an
300. 355 N.Y.S.2d 741 (Civ. Ct. N.Y. County 1974); see also Graphic Arts Mut.
Ins. Co. v. Bakers Mut. Ins. Co., 382 N.E.2d 1347 (N.Y. 1978) (not a trover case but a
suit by an automobile insurer against a workers' compensation carrier for a declaratory
judgment as to which company was responsible for insurance coverage in an accident
case. This case further suggests that litigation was replacing traditional mechanisms
within an industry as the preferred way to resolve disputes).
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individual. For instance, an animal trainer who gave a performance during halftime at a football game was held not to have had his privacy interests infringed by a commercial telecast of his performance. 30 1 Nor
were a famous designer's rights infiinged by the public attachment of her
name to a dress she had in fact designed. °2 The same was true for a child
prodigy turned recluse,30 3 and for a husband of a famous feminist leader
whose wife chose to write about their marriage after her divorce.3°
On the other hand, courts found privacy violations in cases involving
305
a contest winner whose winning entry was altered without her consent,
an entrepreneur for whom an adult educational career game was named
without his consent, 30 6 and a judge whose integrity was challenged in an
advertisement on behalf of a newspaper conducting an investigative report about him. 30 7
Interesting doctrinal developments also included a holding that New
York's privacy statute gave a remedy in the case of a fictionalized depiction of a person's life; 30 8 a ruling that the state could be sued if, in its
non-governmental activities, it engaged in commercial exploitation of an
individual; 30 9 and a decision that Elvis Presley's right not to be subject to
commercial exploitation, except by his licensees, extended beyond his
death. 3 10 Doctrinal retreats occurred in trivial cases, such as in one hold-

301. See Gautier v. Pro-Football, Inc., 107 N.E.2d 485, 489 (N.Y. 1952).
302. See Jaccard v. R.H. Macy & Co., 37 N.Y.S.2d 570, 571 (1st Dep't 1942).
303. See Sidis v. F-R Pub. Corp., 113 F.2d 806, 810-11 (2d Cir. 1940).
304. See Friedan v. Friedan, 414 F. Supp. 77, 78-79 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
305. See Manger v. Kree Inst. of Electrolysis, Inc., 233 F.2d 5, 8-9 (2d Cir. 1956).
306. See Rosemont Enter., Inc. v. Urban Sys. Inc., 345 N.Y.S.2d 17, 18 (1st Dep't

1973).
307.

See Rinaldi v. Village Voice, Inc., 359 N.Y.S.2d 176, 181 (Sup. Ct. N.Y.

County 1974).
308. See Garner v. Triangle Publications, Inc., 97 F. Supp. 546, 550 (S.D.N.Y.
1951).
309. See Seidelman v. State, 110 N.Y.S.2d 380, 381 (Cl. Ct. 1952).
310. See Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 579 F.2d 215, 221 (2d Cir. 1978) (suit
for misappropriation after death of the name and likeness of Elvis Presley).
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ing that the likeness of a dog was not subject to privacy protection, 311 and
in major cases like Time, Inc. v. Hill,1 2 where the United States Supreme
Court held that the scope of New York's privacy right was limited by the
First Amendment's free speech and press guarantees.
This layering of doctrine, however, often blurred the line between
the permissible and the impermissible. The line is best illustrated perhaps
by the distinction between Murray v. New York Magazine Co.,3 ' which
held that a person photographed in Irish garb at the St. Patrick's Day Parade had no actionable claim when his picture was used two years later
on the cover of a magazine containing an article about Irish immigration
to contemporary New York, and Flores v. Mosler Safe Co.,3 14 which upheld a claim against a defendant that reprinted news stories about a fire
involving the plaintiff in advertisements for its products. Yet, many decisions seem quite inconsistent with each other. Consider, for example,
Everett v. Carvel Corp.,3 5 where a photograph of a child, who was the
10,000th visitor to Carvel's ice cream factory, was published in a newspaper without consent; and Paulsen v. PersonalityPosters,Inc.,316 where
a photograph of the plaintiff, who was conducting a mock presidential
campaign, was used on an unauthorized poster. Consistent with the
Murray case, both plaintiffs were denied relief on the ground that the
pictures for which they sued were newsworthy. 317 On the other hand, the
plaintiff in Miller v. Madison Square Garden Corp.,318 whose picture
riding a horse was published in a booklet sold to patrons at a bicycle
race, won.
One must also consider the cases involving pictures of scantily clad
and nude subjects. In one such case, a professional model recovered

311.
312.
313.
314.
315.
316.
317.
318.

See Lawrence v. Ylla, 55 N.Y.S.2d 343, 345 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1945).
385 U.S. 374,387-88 (1967).
267 N.E.2d 256 (N.Y. 1971).
164 N.E.2d 853 (N.Y. 1959).
334 N.Y.S.2d 922 (Sup. Ct. Westchester County 1972).
299 N.Y.S.2d 501 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1968).
See Everett, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 924; Paulsen,299 N.Y.S.2d at 507.
28N.Y.S.2d 811 (Sup. Ct.N.Y. County 1941).
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damages for unauthorized use of her nude photograph in the 1955 publication of U.S. Camera Annual.319 In a second case, a prominent novelist
and screenwriter won a motion for summary judgment from a magazine
that had erroneously attached her name to pictures of a nude woman and
an orgy scene.320 In a third case, the boxer Muhammad Ali obtained a
preliminary injunction against distribution of an issue of PlaygirlMagazine containing a photograph of "a nude black man seated in the comer
of a boxing ring ...unmistakably recognizable as plaintiff Ali. ' ' 21 On
the other hand, a candidate for the title of "Mr. Universe-1956" lost his
suit arising out of the attachment of his picture to an article discussing
the relationship between muscular development and virility; 322 an actress
who had performed nude scenes had her complaint dismissed when it
appeared that the producer intended only to exhibit the film at the Cannes
Film Festival in an effort to obtain financial backing; 323 and the actress
Ann-Margaret lost her suit against the magazine High Society Celebrity
Skin, which, against her express conditions, had obtained still photofrom a film in which she had appeared "unclothed from the waist
graphs
32 4
up."

One must also consider two cases involving unauthorized biographies. The older of the two, Spahn v. JulianMessner, Inc.,325 involved a
suit by "one of professional baseball's great left-handed pitchers"3 26 for
damages and an injunction against an unauthorized publication of a ficti-

319. See Myers v. U.S. Camera Publ'g Corp., 167 N.Y.S.2d 771, 774 (Civ. Ct.
N.Y. County 1957).
320. See Lerman v. Chuckleberry Publ'g, Inc., 496 F. Supp. 1105, 1107, 1109
(S.D.N.Y. 1980).
321. Ali v. Playgirl, Inc., 447 F. Supp. 723, 725 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
322. See Delinger v. American News Co., 178 N.Y.S.2d 231, 232 (1st Dep't
1958).
323. See McGraw v. Watkins, 373 N.Y.S.2d 663, 664-65 (3d Dep't 1975).
324. See Ann-Margret v. High Soc'y Magazine, Inc., 498 F. Supp. 401, 403
(S.D.N.Y. 1980).
325. 221 N.E.2d 543 (N.Y. 1966), remandedfor reconsiderationin light of Time,
Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, aff'd,233 N.E.2d 840 (N.Y. 1967).

326. Id. at 544.
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tious biography of his life. On remand from the Supreme Court, the New
York Court of Appeals adhered to its prior decision granting Spahn both
damages and injunctive relief, since it found the falsified biography had
been published with reckless disregard of the truth. To allow publication
of the book, the Court reasoned, would grant "a literary license ... destructive of an individual's right-albeit a limited one in the case of a
public figure-to be free of the commercial exploitation of his name and
personality., 327 The New York Court of Appeals refused, however, to
interfere with the publication of the next biography that came before itone of Ernest Hemingway-on the ground that there was "no allegation
... of any misstatement knowingly or recklessly made" and thus there
could be no28 objection to the author's making a profit out of Hemming3
way's life.
Although it may have been constitutionally compelled, the distinction drawn by the court made little sense in terms of the underlying remedial purposes of New York's privacy legislation. The distinction, in
effect, transformed New York's property-protective rule that people, famous or otherwise, could stop others from commercially appropriating
their personalities into a body of moralistic doctrine that gave private
individuals a right to stop any publication concerning themselves, but
gave public figures a similar right only if the publication was knowingly
or recklessly false.
The New York Court of Appeals took a further step toward redefin329
ing New York's law of privacy in Nader v. General Motors Corp.,
when it upheld Ralph Nader's "right to protect" himself "from having"
his "private affairs known to others and to keep secret or intimate facts
about" himself "from the prying eyes or ears of others. ' 330 It specifically
held that General Motors' "unauthorized wiretapping and eavesdropping" and "'overzealous' ... surveillance," if proved, violated Nader's

327.
328.
1968).
329.
330.

Spahn v. Julian Messner, Inc., 233 N.E.2d 840, 843 (N.Y. 1967).
Estate of Hemingway v. Random House, Inc., 244 N.E.2d 250, 258 (N.Y.
255 N.E.2d 765 (N.Y. 1970).
Id. at 768.
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privacy rights. 331 The court reached this conclusion, however, by applying District of Columbia rather than New York law to the case.
A later case, however, did apply New York law, and it reached essentially the same result in its holding that a newspaper publication of
allegations in a divorce proceeding, obtained in violation of the proceeding's confidentiality, constituted an invasion of privacy. The court
reached this result even though no special advertising or commercialization had occurred in the case, which had involved nothing more than
simple newspaper stories. 332 It accordingly seemed that New York law
had been transformed into a body of doctrine protecting the ethical value
of privacy as well as property, and that mere public revelation of private
facts about a person would give rise to a cause of action for violation of
privacy.
But the court did not state that a new cause of action had come into
existence, and, as a result, its holding left the lower courts somewhat
confused. Citing Griswold v. Connecticu 33, Roe v. Wade,3 3 4 and Nader
v. General Motors335 and taking note "of the expanding recognition of
invasion of privacy actions," 336 the appellate division held that a complaint alleging a psychiatrist's disclosure of confidential patient communications stated a cause of action for invasion of privacy. The appellate
division then remanded the case for trial, 337 which the plaintiff ultimately
won.338 In contrast, in a case in which a school district had divulged information given by a pupil to its employees in confidence, the court declared that the "invasion of privacy theory [could] be quickly dismissed,"
since New York law merely prohibited "the commercial exploitation of a
person's name, portrait or picture" and "the line of decisions" had "in-

331.
332.
333.
334.
335.
336.
337.
338.

Id. at770.
See Shiles v. News Syndicate Co., 261 N.E.2d 251, 252 (N.Y. 1970).
381 U.S. 479 (1965).
410 U.S. 1131973).
255 N.E.2d 765 (N.Y. 1970).
Doe v. Roe, 345 N.Y.S.2d 560, 562 (1st Dep't 1973).
Id.
Doe v. Roe, 400 N.Y.S.2d 668, 679-80 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1977).
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variably
confined" the granting of relief "to such commercial situa3 39
tions.,,

The court then turned to a discussion of the Nader case, which it read
as one involving intentional infliction of emotional distress, and held that
the school district's divulging of information might "well constitute outrageous actionable conduct," which a plaintiff had a right to show at
trial.340 A third case held that an insurance company's publication of an
article about the plaintiffs' automobile accident injuries and damage
claims, which were labelled "astronomical," might impair their right to
an impartial jury and thus could be enjoined. 4 1 In contrast, a final case
held that a political candidate's use in a campaign advertisement of a
photograph of the plaintiff, who had been charged with killing two New
York City policemen, was absolutely privileged.342
In a series of cases with significant political overtones, federal judges
sitting in New York read the New York Court of Appeals cases more
uniformly as creating a true right of privacy. Although federal judges
recognized that legislators were immune to suits stemming from statements they made within the context of their legislative duties, 343 and that
actions for invasion of privacy would not lie absent allegations of specific harm,344 they read New York law as providing authority for privacy
suits brought on behalf of Dr. Benjamin Spock, who alleged that the National Security Agency had intercepted his oral, wire, telephone, and
telegraph communications; 345 on behalf of the Socialist Workers Party,
which alleged that the FBI had engaged in illegal informant activities and
339.

Blair v. Union Free Sch. Dist. #6, 324 N.Y.S.2d 222, 223 (Dist. Ct. Suffolk

County 1971).
340. Id. at 228.
341. Quinn v. Aetna Life & Cas. Co., 409 N.Y.S.2d 473, 475 (Sup. Ct. Queens
County 1978).
342. See Davis v. Duryea, 417 N.Y.S.2d 624, 625, 628-29 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County
1979).
343.

See Bergman v. Stein, 404 F. Supp. 287, 298-99 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).

344. See Fifth Ave. Peace Parade Comm. v. Gray, 480 F.2d 326, 333 (2d Cir.
1973).
345.

See Spock v. United States, 464 F. Supp. 510, 513 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
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in illegal disruption of the party's political activities; 346 and on behalf of
several individuals whose mail had been unlawfully opened by the
CIA. 347 A federal court also upheld an invasion of privacy claim brought
on behalf of Jacqueline Kennedy Onassis against a photographer who
kept her under close surveillance, harassed her, and carried out paparazzi
attacks.34 8 In reaching these results, federal judges declared that they
were "not obliged automatically to apply the last highest state court determination," but should "hold as [they] believe[d] the state court would
hold today." 349 They were, in turn, "persuade[d] ... that Nader foreshadowe[d] the course that the New York Court of Appeals would follow
today in dealing with intrusions on the right of privacy" 350 and that the
"evidence [was] overwhelming that New York would recognize the
common law right of privacy sufficiently to compensate for" intrusion
into private mail and similar areas. 51 Indeed, even the Second Circuit
"extreme, physical invaoverruled its earlier decisions and agreed that
35 2
York.
New
in
actionable
was
privacy"
of
sion
The New York Court of Appeals, however, would not state clearly
what everyone else believed it would and should state-that a broad,
general common law right of privacy existed in New York. Puzzlingly
citing Nader andFlores, it would declare only that:
whatever may be the law in other jurisdictions with respect to the
right to judicial relief for invasion of privacy in consequence of
unreasonable publicity, in our State thus far there has been no
recognition of such right other than under sections 50 and 51 of
346. See Socialist Workers Party v. Attorney Gen., 463 F. Supp. 515, 522

(S.D.N.Y. 1978).
347. See Birnbaum v. United States, 436 F. Supp. 967, 976 (E.D.N.Y. 1977), affd
as modifiedon other grounds,588 F.2d 319 (2d Cir. 1978).

348. See Galella v. Onassis, 353 F. Supp. 196, 203-204 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), affd,
487 F.2d 986, 991-992 (2d Cir. 1973).

349. Spock, 464 F. Supp. at 516.
350. Galella,353 F. Supp. at 231.
351. Birnbaum, 436 F. Supp. at 978.
352. Meeropol v. Nizer, 560 F.2d 1061, 1067 (2d Cir. 1977).
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the Civil Rights Law. 3
This was the ultimate contradiction in an otherwise conflicted and
confusing body of doctrine.
Ill.

CONCLUSION

It was, however, the same contradiction that ran through the law of
trespass, conversion, fraud, privacy, and tortious interference with contract by the end of the 1970s. All five areas of law retained much of their
initial function of serving an essentially ethical end of preserving private
wealth and property. In mid-century, they had also begun to assume new
ethical goals of upholding business morality, of shielding the weak and
poor from the manipulations of the wealthy and powerful, and, perhaps,
of protecting personal privacy. All four ethical goals were at odds, however, with other judicial concerns for business efficiency, freedom of
opportunity, and hence upward social mobility that became increasingly
important as the century progressed and descendants of immigrants
achieved positions of dominance on the New York bench. The end result
was a doctrinal mix of ethical and efficiency overlays atop a pro-property
foundation. It was a mix that was reflective, in turn, of the demographic
mix that characterized the population of New York and much of America.
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